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ABSTRACT
This dissertation proposes a new way of thinking about Muslims, religion and politics in 
Australia. It critically engages those commentators, academics and politicians who in recent 
years have used the language of ‘secularism’ to denounce publicly what they see as a major 
social and political threat posed by Australia’s growing Muslim population. The worn-out 
nineteenth-century ideology of secularism they draw upon presupposes the irrational 
primitivism of religion and fails to recognise present-day counter-trends. It should be rejected. 
This dissertation calls for a radical rethinking of the appropriate relations between religion 
and politics in a democratic society like Australia. It suggests that the principle of ‘religious 
secularity’ might be the answer: a new twenty-first century secularism which has room for the 
public flourishing of religions at the level of society, but maintains the independence of the 
state from religion. The dissertation shows, contrary to common perceptions, and despite the 
resilience of their highly visible and public religiosity, that Australia’s large Muslim 
communities overwhelmingly support the autonomy of state institutions from religious 
influence, and that they are important protagonists of the new secularism.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES 5
INTRODUCTION 6
The political significance of Australia’s growing Muslim population 7
Australia’s universal implications: the role of religion in secular societies 13
The argument in brief 17
LITERATURE REVIEW 20
METHODOLOGIES 22
CHAPTER ONE 27
Presumption #1: Islam is incompatible with secularism 27
Presumption #2: Secularism is a necessary condition of modernity 33
What form of secularism is desirable in a democracy? 41
CHAPTER TWO 45
History of Muslims in Australia 46
The public religiosity of Australian Muslim communities 52
CHAPTER THREE 60
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 62
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 70
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 74
CONCLUSION 79
BIBLIOGRAPHY 82
ENDNOTES 94
4
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Muslims praying on the street outside Lakemba mosque, Western Sydney  1
Figure 2: Frequency of prayer (table)        54
Figure 3: An artist in Sydney’s Inner West publicly calls for a ban of the ‘burqa’  55
Figure 4: ‘Jesus, a prophet of Islam’ billboard      57
Figure 5: Salam Cafe, SBS         59
Figure 6: The fake flyer distributed by Husic’s opponents in the 2004 Greenway election 77
5
INTRODUCTION
Earlier this year, The Australian’s foreign editor Greg Sheridan made a bold contribution to 
the popular discourse on religion, culture and politics. Hitherto a long-standing proponent of 
multiculturalism, Sheridan declared his new-found opposition to the policy, insisting that ‘not 
all immigrants are the same’; that Australia’s ‘Muslim immigration problems’ pose challenges 
to our secular way of life because ‘the community of Islam [is] church and state in one, with 
the two indistinguishably interwoven’; and that ‘to make all religions seem equal is simply to 
deny reality’ (2011). His point, rarely voiced so candidly, underscores a belief which exists in 
the common sense of many Australians: that the Muslim presence poses a threat to the secular 
foundations of Australia and, consequently, to social cohesion in a multi-ethnic and multi-
religious nation. 
Sheridan’s sentiments were regrettably uncontroversial. Whilst his remarks drew some mild 
criticism from Immigration Minister Chris Bowen (2011), and the Federation of Ethnic 
Communities Council of Australia (2011), there was no mainstream backlash against his 
views, which in digital form were widely circulated. This is because Sheridan’s article 
reflected two prevailing ‘common sense’ normative presumptions. First, many people believe 
that in modern times religion should be a private matter; or, put differently, that an assertive 
form of secularism which relegates religion to the private sphere is a necessary or desirable 
feature of a modern democratic society like Australia. Public expressions of religion of the 
kind pictured on the front page of this dissertation ostensibly violate Australia’s secular ethos. 
This perception is underpinned by a second presumption, usually held unthinkingly, and often 
reinforced by the ethnocentricity of popular culture: that Muslims are generally resistant to 
the secularising forces of modernity, due to the inescapably ‘other-worldly’ and thus 
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politically ‘fundamentalist’ character of Islam. This presumption draws upon an historical line 
of literature which characterises Islam as an impediment to democracy, secularism and 
modernity. It is central to what Edward Said famously dubbed ‘Orientalism’: the perception of 
Eastern peoples as exotic, highly religious, other-worldly and less than civilised, and thereby 
prone to lapses of violence, authoritarianism and despotism (1978). 
The power of these presumptions in the Australian context is not to be underestimated. Their 
grip can only be broken by developing a new perspective on the subject of secularism, 
modernity and Islam, one that is historically aware, theoretically sensitive and empirically 
well-informed. This dissertation pushes in this direction. It proceeds on two fronts. First, it 
proposes that the bigotry which has accompanied the growth of Australia’s Muslim population 
is cause for rethinking the old, worn-out ideology of secularism. The dissertation argues that 
certain presumptions which dominate the public debate on religion and secularism generally, 
and the place of Islam in particular, should be firmly rejected. It sets out descriptively, using 
new methods, with a sense of the history and the normative implications, a fresh 
understanding of the role of religion in Australian society. The dissertation proposes a second 
reason why a new perspective is needed: it argues that the Australian case is important 
because it has the potential to serve as a blueprint elsewhere for understanding and rethinking 
the role of religion in modern, secular societies. 
1.The political significance of Australia’s growing Muslim population
On the 2006 census, 399,000 Australians identified as ‘Muslim’. The Muslim population is 
predicted to swell to 714,000 by 2030 (Warne-Smith 2011). Given this projected growth, a 
broad re-examination of the appropriate relationship between religion and politics in Australia 
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is long overdue. This necessarily involves rethinking the meaning of ‘secularism’, as the 
ideology which governs the place of religion in society. 
Secularism is a neologism of nineteenth century Europe, where in doctrinal form it 
championed the view that an irreversible process of religious extinction, or ‘secularisation’, 
was underway. Secularisation, another new word of this period, referred to a process by which 
secularism slowly acquired the upper hand through the course of modernisation. In a modern 
society, ran the argument, religion ought to be replaced by ‘reason’ and ‘science’. This belief 
underpinned the work of countless social analysts and philosophers. Marx characterised 
religion as an ‘opiate of the masses’; Nietzsche proclaimed that ‘God is dead’; Freud 
suggested that religion is an illusion out of which we must be ‘educated’; and Sartre claimed 
that there was either ‘God or freedom’. The political doctrine of secularism emerged in this 
context, as a project to tame or eliminate religion. It was an attempt to confine religion to the 
private sphere because religion was seen as a foolish irrationality, an object of suspicion, an 
illusory force to be kept out of the public realm. 
European secularisation theorists reinforced these deep-seated beliefs, highlighting the 
primitivism of religion and predicting its inevitable decline in the modern world. Beginning 
with Max Weber, through the twentieth century a substantial tradition of scholarship drew a 
necessary causal link between processes of modernisation and the declining social 
significance of religion in the fabric of modern life. This tradition presupposed a dualism 
between religion on the one hand, and secularism on the other. As secularism emerged, it was 
argued, religion would inevitably decline. 
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It is becoming clear in retrospect that processes of secularisation are neither universal nor 
one-dimensional. Especially when a more global perspective is adopted, including cases such 
as Australia, it is evident that secularisation is not a singular process, but that it rather 
comprises three distinct and detachable trends which may or may not overlap and reinforce 
each other (Casanova 1994). Secularisation can involve (i) the overall decline in people’s 
lives of religious beliefs and practices; (ii) the privatisation of religion, in the sense of the 
elimination of religion from the public spheres of society; and (iii) the differentiation of 
secular spheres of life, such as the state, the economy and science, from religious institutions 
and norms. In this third sense, secularisation refers specifically to the transfer of persons, 
things and meanings from ecclesiastical or religious to civil or lay use, possession or control. 
It points to a different understanding of secularism as a policy of maintaining a measure of 
distance between secular institutions - such as the legal system, the parliament, or schools and 
universities - and religious principles and ways of life. 
Although Weber supposed the coincidence of these three trends in post-Enlightenment 
Europe, the processes conspicuously diverge in most contemporary societies. Old ideologies 
of secularism based upon the coincidence and mutual reinforcement of these three processes 
are thus outdated. They assume that the secularisation of society, meaning religion’s 
privatisation and decline, is synonymous with policies of secularism which mandate the 
independence and differentiation of institutions of the state from religious influence. 
There is hypocrisy in this old doctrine of secularism, which must be seen as a sublimated 
form of Western European Christianity (Celermajer 2007; Taylor 2007). For the claim that 
religion can be contained in ‘the private sphere’, without violating its essential integrity, only 
makes sense in the context of Protestant Christianity, which locates the religious essence in a 
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personal, internal and private relationship with God, rather than in works or the arrangement 
of public institutions. Thus, the old secularism which demands the confinement of religion to 
the private sphere cannot treat all religions equally, because ‘different religions demand 
different types of commitments, spanning what we now think of as the public and private 
spheres in very different ways’ (Celermajer 2007: 112). As this traditional understanding of 
secularism cannot be applied to non-Christian religions, it must be rethought in the context of 
modern multi-ethnic and multi-religious Australia.
This dissertation proposes a dramatic shift in the meaning of the term ‘secularism’. We must 
discard the old ideology of secularism which sees the secularisation of society as equivalent to 
the privatisation or outright extinction of religion. A different way of thinking is proposed, 
backed up by a radically different understanding of a secular state, whose prime role is to 
enhance the free-thinking pluralism of democracy through a stance of active neutrality 
towards different religions, which are then able to flourish both in the public and private 
spheres. It is evident in the twenty-first century that a religious society, in which religion has 
not withered away or retreated to the private realm, can readily exist alongside a secular state, 
which stands at some distance from religious institutions and norms. The worn-out 
nineteenth-century ideology of secularism must be rethought to reflect this reality. This 
dissertation suggests that in Australia a new, twenty-first century paradigm for governing the 
relations between religion and politics - an entirely new understanding of secularism - has to 
make room for ‘religious secularity’, a phrase which rejects the obsolete dualism between 
‘religion’ and ‘secularism’,1 and promotes the flourishing of public religions in society, whilst 
maintaining the even-handedness of the state towards different religions.
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What does this new secularism require? Neutrality of the state is not equivalent to its strict 
separation from religion; there can be interventions by the state into the lives of religious 
believers to ensure inter-religious harmony and social cohesion. Instead, it involves the 
freedom of state institutions from religious bias, alongside tolerance by the state of the 
flourishing of religions in the public and private spheres of society. A democratic state should 
attempt to enforce no one religion, to treat all believers and non-believers with equal respect, 
and to preserve a public space for the free exercise and expression of religions in society. This 
tolerance must be reciprocated by religions, which must respect the independence of the state 
to ensure its impartiality. This is achieved by a measure of ‘differentiation’ between state 
institutions and religious institutions and norms. Thus, the new secularism involves a multi-
religious democracy defined by the independent existence and public expression of religion in 
the realm of society and recognition of the need for the independence of the state from 
religion, and thus an active neutrality of the state towards religions.2
More than a few Australian commentators fear that Muslims undermine this arrangement; 
since they presume the inherently political nature of Islam they suspect that it cannot respect 
nor tolerate the freedom of state institutions from religion. This presumption will be shown in 
this dissertation to be unfounded. There is great respect for the secular nature of Australia's 
institutions among Muslim communities, which implies - paradoxically - that they are an 
important active source of support for the new secularism. The presence of the Muslim 
diaspora may enhance the even-handedness of the Australian state towards religion, especially 
by forcing public debate on the proper place of the state in protecting religion in the public 
square. All public debates are informed by personal beliefs of some variety, and whilst 
religious beliefs must not be privileged in the public sphere, nor should they be excluded from 
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it by legal and political means. The ‘separation’ of religion from the state should not be 
confused with its role in protecting religious expression in society.
Any attempt to radically alter the meaning of secularism necessarily involves revisiting and 
probably discarding entrenched and confused presumptions about the proper place of religion 
in contemporary societies, and Islam’s incompatibility with this antiquated, ethnocentric form 
of secularism. Fierce debates informed by deep-seated and poorly-defined prejudices 
surrounding the Muslim presence in Australia have emerged in popular discourses. 
Commentators like Sheridan adopt the language of secularism without the requisite awareness 
of the normative presumptions upon which this language is built. Some claim that Muslims 
threaten Australian secularism; others insist that secularism in the old sense is being disrupted 
by a publicly virile and thereby primitive religious minority.
This naiveté in popular discourses is a direct consequence of the lack of scholarly inquiry in 
Australia which challenges the dominant presumptions about secularism and Islam. By 
contrast, in Western Europe for instance,3 a sophisticated conversation about the proper place 
of religion, and especially a public religion like Islam, in modern democracies is taking place 
in response to rapidly increasing and deepening religious pluralism (see, e.g. Asad 2003; 
Casanova 1994; Taylor 2007). This dissertation points out that much can be learned about the 
Australian case by engaging this conversation. 
Drawing upon this material, and with fresh local evidence, this dissertation argues that in 
Australia the old presumption that the retreat of religion to the private sphere is a necessary 
condition of democratic life is no longer relevant. It shows that religion is not dying away; 
and that for several strong reasons, religious pluralism is now a permanent feature of modern 
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Australia. Muslim communities are flourishing, both demographically and religiously, and are 
a visible feature of the Australian social and political landscape. Yet it does not follow that the 
object of secularism - to preserve peace among and within religions - is at risk. A new 
secularism is conceivable: the secularity of state institutions does not require the exclusion of 
religion from public life, nor the facilitation of its decline in society. Religious secularity is a 
real possibility. 
This dissertation shows that Muslims are generally supportive of this new secularism. It 
reveals that there is no widespread push within Australian Muslim communities to undermine 
the ability of legal, political or educational institutions to operate without reference to 
religious principles. Contrary to mainstream perceptions, there is great respect among Muslim 
communities for Australia’s secular institutional architecture.
2.Australia’s universal implications: the role of religion in secular societies
It is contended in the pages that follow that the Australian case may have important universal 
implications for policies of secularism as public religions re-emerge globally. Australia’s 
unique historical and legal landscape makes it an appropriate place for developing a cutting-
edge model of new secularism. 
The Australian trend has been largely ignored by scholars of secularism. Elsewhere, an 
ongoing conversation about the proper place of religion is taking place among theorists such 
as Jose Casanova (2006, 2009b, 2009a, 2011), Talal Asad (2003), and Charles Taylor (2007).4 
Casanova ventures outside Europe and the United States for only one of five case studies, to 
Brazil. The Indian scholar Rajeev Bhargava (1998) injects a fresh, non-Western perspective 
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into the debate. Yet despite the oft-repeated need for a ‘global’ perspective, Western Europe 
and the United States remain the focus. Australia - a society of European heritage, facing 
similar demographic transformations to Western Europe in terms of rising religious pluralism, 
but with a very different historical and legal landscape - remains virtually unexplored. 
This is unfortunate, if only because Australia has the potential to serve as a model of a 
different secularism which is consistent with the multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of its 
society. Australia is an apt place for redefining secularism because the relationship between 
religion and society is legally imprecise and historically unsettled. This is unlike France, for 
instance, where laïcité is both legally enshrined and a deeply entrenched part of the national 
identity. In Australia, there is no well-articulated and sophisticated ideology of secularism, but 
rather an inchoate common sense understanding that religion and politics should not co-
mingle. The Anglican Bishop Tom Frame points out that many Australians ‘imagine’ a wall of 
separation between church and state, when in practice, it does not rigidly exist (2006). 
Australia’s legal and historical ambivalence towards secularism thus makes it a fertile ground 
for rethinking the proper relationship between the secular democratic state, public life and 
religion.
The ambivalence stems from the fact that, until recently, religion was relatively uncontentious 
in Australian politics. Social commentators in the 1960s remarked that ‘churches no longer 
matter very much to most Australians’ and that the Australian attitude towards religion ‘is one 
of apathy’ (Horne 1964; McGregor 1968). This lethargy poses an opportunity for the new 
secularism. It means that those who champion democracy and share its aspirations to equality 
and religious freedom are likely to support the new secularism on those grounds, because they 
have no strong historical ties to a particular pattern of religion-state relations.
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The capacity for reform is enhanced by uncertainty in the law. The ambiguous interpretation 
of secularism by the Australian courts creates substantial room to experiment with a new form 
of secularism. The legal relationship between the state and religion in Australia is enshrined in 
section 116 of the Constitution. This section precludes the Commonwealth from passing any 
law establishing a religion, or any law which prohibits the free exercise of religion. It has a 
narrow scope, applying only to Commonwealth, and not to State, laws. No law has yet been 
struck down as offensive to the clause, despite several High Court challenges. In the most 
authoritative case,5 as well as the most recent case,6 the High Court concluded that in order 
for a law to be offensive to the section, it must have the purpose of achieving an object which 
section 116 forbids, despite the law’s effect. In interpreting the clause narrowly, the High 
Court left the parliament to decide what secularism means in Australia. This is in stark 
contrast to France, for instance, where it was left to the Conseil d’Etat in 1989 to decide that 
the wearing of religious dress in schools was compatible with laïcité (Gray 2011: 8).
This unique legal ambiguity and historical apathy points the potential for a new understanding 
of secularism in Australia. Its model of secularism could emerge as a global pace-setter. 
Countries around the world, but especially in Western Europe, are currently experiencing 
unprecedented levels of religious pluralism, and are responding badly. The old, dogmatic 
secularism is making a comeback in Western Europe. The public religiosity of Muslims has 
triggered a backlash. Laws which prohibit covering the face have emerged in France (April 
2011) and Belgium (July 2011), and such laws are imminent in Italy, Denmark, Austria, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland (Chrisafis 2011).
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The institutional adjustments required to achieve a multi-religious secularism in Europe are 
difficult to achieve because of the continent’s history. European secularism arose in 
predominantly single-religion societies (Bhargava 2011). The historical development of 
religiously homogenous nation-states in Europe fostered a uniquely ethnocentric approach 
which has most recently led to the widespread abandonment of the policy of multiculturalism. 
The scale of migration from the Muslim world is also significantly higher in Western Europe 
than in Australia. The traditional ideology of “secularism” - often involving hostility to public 
displays of any religion but Christianity - is therefore so entrenched in much of Western 
Europe that few astute mainstream politicians dare openly advocate its reform at the present 
time.
By contrast, and despite the prejudice against Muslims in some quarters, Australia has 
recently reiterated its commitment to multiculturalism (Bowen 2011). As a nation of 
immigrants, it is not only more accepting of cultural ‘Otherness’, but is more comfortable 
with religious diversity, often for reasons of apathy. In Australia, the push to prohibit face 
coverings in public spaces (for instance) is thus a fringe policy, advocated only by those on 
the far right of the political spectrum. Here, then, is an opportunity. If an Australian working 
prototype of ‘religious secularity’ can be established, it could serve as an exemplar for other 
societies coming to terms with religious pluralism, especially those countries of Judeo-
Christian heritage experiencing increasing Muslim immigration. 
Australia could enlighten Western European democracies to the possibility that there is room 
within secularism for public religiosity on a societal level, as long as a measure of freedom of 
secular state institutions from religious influence is maintained. Religious secularity is a more 
inclusive form of secularism which befits a multi-religious, modern democratic society. It 
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appreciates that of the three processes of secularisation identified above, only one is a vital 
condition of modernity: the development of a secular state, operationalised through the 
differentiation of religious and government institutions. Crucially, Australian Muslim 
communities respect this key aspect of secularism, as is demonstrated in the pages that follow. 
The argument in brief
On these premises, the central argument of this dissertation is three-dimensional. First, within 
Australian Muslim communities religion is flourishing. Religion shows no sign of declining, 
nor of retreating to the private sphere. Second: this dissertation argues that the presence of 
publicly religious Muslims is forcing a vigorous debate about the place of religion in modern 
society into the public domain. Crucially, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the 
defensible core of the old secularism - the separation of religion from key secular institutions 
- is overwhelmingly respected by Muslim communities. A third key theme of the dissertation 
is that policies of secularism based upon outdated presumptions involving a uniquely 
Christian dualism between ‘religion’ and ‘secularism’ are no longer sufficient to deal with the 
complex dynamics of a modern democracy such as Australia. It is argued, instead, that we 
need a new form of secularism which recognises that a religious society can exist alongside a 
secular state. It is concluded that if Australia successfully adopts this more tolerant and multi-
religious form of secularism, it might serve as a best-practice blueprint which could be 
adopted elsewhere, for instance by Western European states which are for the moment dealing  
badly with similar challenges to the old secularism.
This dissertation comprises three chapters. Chapter one provides the intellectual background 
to the two presumptions which are challenged in this dissertation: that Islam is antithetical to 
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secularism, and that secularism in the old sense is a necessary condition of modernity. It 
underscores the entrenched tradition of Orientalism in Western thinking. It goes on to 
detangle and reconceptualise the architecture of existing theories of secularisation. Chapter 
two argues that in the case of Australian Muslim communities, there is no evidence for either 
religious decline or religion’s retreat into the private sphere, and that this is the primary 
trigger of apprehension in some quarters about the growing Muslim presence. Muslims are 
seen as a threat to the supposed ‘secular’ nature of Australian society.  Against this 
apprehension, chapter three points out that there is substantial support within Australia’s 
Muslim communities for a secular state. It argues for the vital importance of the 
differentiation of religious and secular sphere. Focusing on three key sets of institutions - the 
spheres of law, education and electoral politics - it is established that the interaction of 
Muslim communities with Australian secular institutions indicates an active willingness 
among Muslims to live in a society where government institutions operate independently of 
religious influence.
Through these lines of analysis, which are drawn together in the conclusion, it is 
demonstrated that traditional theories of secularisation are no longer adequate, and that 
policies based on the old secularism and its presumption that religious decline is progress 
towards ‘reason’ and ‘science’ are outdated. It is shown that the moral and political imperative 
for the new secularism is to ensure the even-handedness of the democratic state in the face of 
religious pluralism. This dissertation insists, against much of the literature, that the strict 
exclusion of religion from secular spaces and institutions is no longer necessary or justifiable 
in a democracy. Counter-intuitively, religion and secularism are seen to be compatible, and 
able to cohabit within everyday life and institutional settings. It is shown in the coming pages 
that if secularism is seen in this fundamentally revised way - as the fluid and malleable 
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modern democratic response to religious pluralism, adaptable to any cultural context, rather 
than as an inflexible and dogmatic brainchild of Christianity - then in the Australian context 
Islam is one of its protagonists. The oxymoronic phrase ‘religious secularity’ is an appropriate 
descriptor for this new secularism, not only because it rejects the dualism of ‘religion’ and 
‘secularism’, but because it abandons the ideological suffix ‘-ism’. The old sense of 
secularism, evident in countries such as France, and sometimes still present in the popular 
discourse in Australia, belongs to former times, to a world of Western European Christianity 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is no longer relevant in the twenty-first century 
world.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
This study explores a virtually untouched subject area. It assesses the implications of 
Australia’s growing Muslim communities for matters of law, education and politics. Whilst 
individually, these topics have been sparsely addressed, no study has thus far drawn upon, and 
fundamentally revised, the theoretical framework of secularism when analysing the 
relationship of Muslim communities with these institutions. 
Two Australian scholars have explored the relationship between Muslims and modernity 
(Bahfen 2010) and secularism (Celermajer 2007), but their attention differs from the present 
work’s focus on specific institutions, and the support within Muslim communities for a new 
secularism. Bahfen’s study is criticised in the coming pages for failing to question mistaken 
presumptions which underlie the prejudiced discourse surrounding Muslims in Australia. 
Celermajer deals with the construction of Muslims as the ‘Other’ through the secularism 
discourse in Australia. Whilst she perceptively challenges the legitimacy of the old, Christian-
centric secularism, the focus of Celermajer’s piece is on why Muslims are regarded as radical 
enemies and threatening outsiders in Australia, whereas this dissertation proposes an 
alternative way forward from this impasse.
This dissertation draws together two bodies of literature: studies of Australia’s Muslim 
communities, and sociological theories of secularisation and secularism. Several Australian 
social scientists have explored Australian Muslim communities, and their work is an 
important source of evidence in the present study. The subjects of these past works include 
histories of Muslims in Australia (Cleland 1993; Jones 1993a; Kabir 2004); issues of cultural 
integration and multiculturalism (Humphrey 1987, 2001); discrimination and Islamophobia 
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(Scott Poynting and Noble 2004); Muslim women and the veil (Jones 1993b); and ethnic and 
religious identities among certain Muslim communities (Bisin et al. 2007; Inglis 2010). 
Australian studies of secularisation mostly predate or ignore the large-scale Muslim migration 
that has happened during the past half-century. Due to the decline in churchgoing and the rise 
in the numbers identifying with ‘no religion’, the prevailing view has been that Australia 
followed traditional European patterns of secularisation (see, e.g. Ely 1981; Hogan 1979, 
2009; McAllister 1988; McCallum 1987, 1988; Mol 1985). A few theorists have observed a 
‘desecularisation’ process (Possamai 2008), yet no theory has emerged which adequately 
accounts for the complex trends we see in Australia. No scholar has assessed the impact of 
migration on these processes, and no study has recognised the need for a new conception of 
secularism which would better suit Australia’s religious diversity. This dissertation takes a 
preliminary step towards filling this gap.
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METHODOLOGIES
How is the gap to be filled? The absence of existing analysis in this area necessitates an 
imaginative mix of methodologies to grasp the complexity of the subject matter at hand. My 
whole approach challenges the prevailing fact-value dichotomy between empirical ‘political 
science’ and normative ‘political theory’. It advocates the adoption of multiple 
methodologies. 
Both quantitative and qualitative purists are convinced of the normative and empirical 
superiority of their methods. They each, implicitly if not explicitly, cling to Howe’s 
incompatibility thesis, which posits that qualitative and quantitative research paradigms 
cannot and should not be mixed (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004: 14). Yet Gerring and 
Yesnowitz (2006) point out that ‘normative theorizing must deal in facts just as empirical 
work must deal in values; they do not inhabit different worlds’ (2006: 108). Facts are seen as 
artefactual. The recognition of this middle-way, post-empiricist approach is vital to the 
continuing relevance of political science to policymakers and citizens. One way of doing this 
involves employing a methodological compromise, which adopts ‘mixed’ or ‘multi-method’ 
approaches, combining the virtues of a sense of the historical contingency of things, the need 
for conceptual clarity and thick descriptions and other empirical work, in order to attack 
complex problems from many angles. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie observe that there are 
pragmatic reasons for employing a method and philosophy that ‘attempts to fit together the 
insights provided by qualitative and quantitative research into a workable solution’ (2004: 
15).
22
A mixed methodology along these lines is especially relevant in an inquiry into Muslim 
diaspora communities, such as Australia’s. In the study of people, one inevitably confronts 
complexity and dynamism in the verbalisation and interpretation by individuals of their own 
experiences. In studies of religion and the world, this complexity is compounded by the desire 
of individuals to meet the normative expectations of their faith, and consequently the 
tendency to see behaviour as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Gabriele Marranci and Jocelyne Cesari, 
two veteran scholars of Muslims in the West, both advocate an interdisciplinary and multi-
method approach for interpreting the complexity of the subject matter. 
Marranci argues that since September 11, 2001 the discourse on Islam, secularism, democracy 
and the ‘West’ has become dangerously essentialised (2010: 1). He notes that we need a 
paradigm through which we can effectively study Muslims as human beings rather than as 
living symbols of a religion (2010: 4). He believes that ‘to reintroduce the individual or 
“human” aspect, we need to observe the dynamics of Muslim lives within societies’ (2010: 4). 
Marranci notes that debates should begin from ‘Muslims’ instead of ‘Islam’; for this reason, 
the dissertation follows Jamila Hussain and Abdullah Saeed to speak of Australian Muslim 
communities rather than a Muslim community, to emphasise ethnic, religious and linguistic 
diversity (Hussain 2001; Saeed 2003). 
Cesari similarly emphasises the need for a specific methodology to facilitate meaningful 
research on Islam and the West, to avoid essentialising Islamic identities (Cesari 2009b: 169). 
According to Cesari, it is ‘increasingly clear that no single academic discipline is equipped to 
accommodate a complete understanding of Islam in the West...an interdisciplinary 
methodology is indispensable for pursuing this new field of research’ (Cesari 2009b: 149). 
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One implication of these points is that something like a theoretically informed and historically 
sensitive political anthropology is now required in the subject area of secularism. A recent 
pioneering methodological analysis along these lines advocates the adoption of 
anthropological methods in political science (Chabal and Doloz 2006). Chabal and Daloz 
argue that political scientists are too quick to equate culture with values. Whilst culture 
studies have a long pedigree in political science - including pathbreaking work by Almond 
and Verba (1963, 1980) and more recent forays by Samuel Huntington (1997) - they almost 
always adopt a normative position which more or less blindly favours values thought to be 
conducive to ‘liberal democracy’ (2006: chapter 3). Chabal and Doloz point out that the entire 
framework is shot through with Westernising or Orientalist assumptions that take our own 
polity as the teleological endpoint towards which all others are converging (2006: 13-15). A 
more open-minded, empirically sensitive interpretive approach is therefore required.
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz famously advocated ‘thick description’ as the best way to 
make sense out of complex human experience. For him, thick description is a form of 
interpretive social science that supposes a philosophical attitude: ‘Believing, with Max Weber, 
that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance that he himself has spun, I take 
culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in 
search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning’ (Geertz 1973: 5). In this 
dissertation I have supposed that an interpretive methodology is deeply attractive insofar as it 
liberates us from own narrow-minded ‘common sense’ perspectives. 
The complexities outlined both above, and in the introduction to this dissertation, require 
resourceful methods. My overall argument engages with the theoretical material and the 
empirical subject matter using three methodologies: qualitative interpretation, in the form of 
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thick descriptions of Muslim communities; quantitative data analysis; and the scrutiny and 
evaluation of concepts and theories. Qualitative sources include: an analysis of the writings of 
fieldworkers in the social sciences who have studied Muslim communities in Australia; a 
reading of the history of Muslims in Australia; speeches, government documents, and 
newspaper articles about Australian Muslims; and an analysis of websites, blogs and other 
publications which have been developed by Australian Muslims. Quantitative data is drawn 
from a variety of studies which provide insights into religious beliefs and practices, and 
attitudes towards religion in the public sphere. In order to make sense of the vast body of 
available information, finally, this dissertation engages with the conceptual framework of 
secularism in order to show the pressing need for its radical revision.
In addition to the normative arguments for the universal adoption of mixed methodologies, 
there are special reasons in this particular subject area for such an approach. Due to the 
pioneering nature of this study, its engagement with a virtually untouched area of research, 
this dissertation had to cope with the dearth of quantitative evidence available. Large-scale 
databases on the attitudes of Australian Muslims do not yet exist. Meanwhile, the diversity of 
the objects of study (i.e. the plurality of Muslim communities in Australia) implies that 
qualitative observations made about one group rarely hold when observing another group. 
Thus, in order to make meaningful generalisations some quantitative analysis remains a 
necessary strategy. But the converse is also true. The so-called facts, and interpretations 
drawn from quantitative and qualitative sources, need theories through which they can be 
understood and explained. Facts require theories, in that theories provide selection criteria for 
what should be considered as relevant or important facts. This need for theory becomes more 
compelling when one considers that the subject matter at hand - the relationship between 
Muslims and secularism - is so burdened by inherited presumptions, biased categories, and 
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taken-for-granted meanings that a critical analysis of preceding theories is imperative. A clear-
headed conceptual methodology proved especially critical to this dissertation, due to the 
attempted bold re-description that takes place in the pages which follow. Revising and shifting 
the meaning of the term ‘secularism’ cannot be accomplished without a nuanced 
understanding of its deep history.
The dissertation acknowledges the contestability of its own claims. By using a mix of 
methods, it dues not suppose that its own findings are instances of absolute Truth. Instead, it 
draws together ‘instrumental and provisional truths that are a matter of degree, not stagnant, 
and that we must be willing tomorrow to call falsehoods’ (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004: 
18). It endorses a form of fallibilism, in that its key conclusion - that a new form of secularism 
is thinkable, practicable and desirable - is seen as an empirically-guided conjecture that is 
certainly subject to contestation, and to further analysis and revision. 
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CHAPTER ONE
Background to the presumptions
The two aforementioned, and clearly related, presumptions are steeped in a long and 
distinguished history of intellectual thought. As these histories have profound consequences 
for depth and potency of the presumptions, they are exposed in this chapter. This facilitates a 
reconsideration of the purposes and objectives of secularism and how they are best achieved 
in a multi-religious society like Australia.
Presumption #1: Islam is incompatible with secularism
To understand why Islam is widely seen as an uncompromising religion self-insulated against 
forces of secularisation, we must familiarise ourselves with the historical category of 
‘religion’. It was during the eighteenth century that for the first time on a substantial scale a 
sustained reflection on ‘religion’ began. In that period, European travellers to the Ottoman 
Empire, the Persian lands and India began to encounter new religions, and thus to think 
comparatively. Was Muhammedanism understandable through the same category as 
Christianity, Hinduism or Sikhism? A definition of ‘religion’ emerged, at the most general and 
abstract level, which referred to a form of experience where human subjects feel themselves 
to be related to and dependent upon a transcendent force, relationship or process. 
However the ‘other-worldly’, transcendent cosmology of this category excluded many 
‘Eastern’ religions, such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism and Shintoism. These religions 
are very much of this world, in that they do not rely upon a transcendental being. 
Confucianism, for instance, is a system of moral, social and political thought which some 
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characterise as merely ‘quasi-religious’, or ‘philosophical’, withholding the category of 
‘religion’. An encompassing definition of religion would hold that the existence of the sacred 
within the discourse of Confucianism (through, for instance, the worship of ancestors) 
qualifies it as a religion. If these traditions were included, the category of religion would 
necessarily be reduced to the abstract concept of an understanding of the sacred or the divine. 
It seemed that religion must be reduced to two forms: ‘this-worldly’ religions and ‘other-
worldly’ religions. 
Out of this debate on the categorisation of ‘religion’, a controversy emerged about whether 
certain religions are more prone to this-worldliness than others. The view developed that 
Christianity is a religion which is not only in touch with this world, but has an imminent 
tendency. This meant that although it was attached to the transcendent characteristics of God 
and other heavenly beings, it has a self-secularising quality. It was this self-disenchanting 
tendency that was noticed by Max Weber, and has recently been reconfirmed by Charles 
Taylor (2007). At the other end of the spectrum was Islam, which was understood as a 
stubbornly other-worldly religion. The identity of the Prophet Muhammad as not only a 
prophet and a teacher, but also a statesmen, a ruler and a soldier, supposedly signified a 
conflation of the functions of religion and state in Islam. In the nineteenth century, the French 
theorist and politician Alexis de Tocqueville championed the view that it was the 
otherworldliness of Islam which was the cause of the underdevelopment, the economic 
misfortunes and what was seen as the legal mayhem of the Arab world. He wrote that:
‘Muhammadanism is the religion that most thoroughly conflated and intermixed 
the powers in such a way that the high priest is necessarily the prince, and the 
prince the high priest, and all acts of civil and political life are more or less 
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governed by religious law...[T]his concentration and this conflation...was the 
primary cause of the despotism and particularly of social immobility that has 
almost always characterized Muslim nations’ (Notes on the Koran, March 1838).
Attitudes such as these were not uncommon, and were often spurs to ‘motivated ignorance’ of 
Islam and powerful justifications for ‘the great violence of conquest perpetrated by European 
colonisers’ (Keane 2009: 129). 
These unquestioned assumptions perpetuate a parochial view of the Muslim world. In 
Orientalism, Edward Said noticed that much of the discourse which denigrates Muslims does 
so unintentionally. He saw Orientalism as a ‘dogma that not only degrades its subject matter 
but also blinds its practitioners’ (1978: 319). Orientalism was the lens through which the West  
distorted the reality of the places and people within ‘the Orient’, and framed the people in 
particular as strange and threatening (1978: 58). Said characterised Orientalism as political 
intellectualism bent on self-affirmation rather than objective study; a form of racism; and a 
tool of imperialist domination (1978: 12). Until recently, the Orientalist belief has prevailed in 
both public discourse and in a heavy weight of literature that Muslim attachment to the 
transcendent is so strong that it cannot and will not secularise. In The Roots of Muslim Rage 
(1990), Bernard Lewis coined the term ‘clash of civilisations’ to describe ‘the perhaps 
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival [Islam] against our Judeo-Christian 
heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both’ (1990, my italics). 
After September 11, 2001, this argument entered mainstream discourses. Huntington 
popularised the view that Islam is incompatible with democracy, secularism and therefore 
modernity. In The Clash of Ignorance (2001), Said characterised Lewis as a ‘veteran 
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Orientalist’, and accused both him and Samuel Huntington (who adopted Lewis’ catchphrase) 
of ‘demagogy and downright ignorance’ in presuming to speak for a whole civilisation. In 
Huntington’s infamous book The Clash of Civilizations (1997), he wrote that Western 
Christianity displays the unique dualism between God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual 
and temporal authority, a dualism that is essential for democracy to flourish. He reformulated 
the Christian adage to ‘render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that 
are God’s’. ‘In Islam’, Huntington proclaims, ‘God is Caesar’ (1997: 70).
This presumption remains prevalent in Australia. The only existing scholarly analysis of 
Australian Muslims, secularism and modernity which currently exists inadequately addresses 
this misconception; in fact, it may serve to reinforce it. Naysa Bahfen in 2010 stated that ‘the 
Islamic viewpoint...does not support the notion that the church and state ought to be 
separated’. Bahfen does not observe that Islam has no conception of ‘church’; she instead 
argues this is because Islamic ideology is at loggerheads with the idea that modernity strictly 
relegates religion to the sphere of the home with no place in public life (2010: 223). Such a 
position is often preceded by a holistic, encompassing and dogmatic conception of secularism. 
The argument that religion and state institutions ought to be separated must be distinguished 
from the fundamentally different idea of religion being relegated to the sphere of the ‘home’, 
with no place in the public spheres of civil society, political society or the state. 
Casanova notes that despite its nature as a political as well as a religious community, ‘it is 
totally inaccurate to argue that Islam has no differentiated religious and political 
spheres’ (1994: 48). The eleventh-century Muslim theologian Abu Hamid Muhammad al-
Ghazali stated in 1058 AD:
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‘Know that you can have three sorts of relations with princes, governors, and 
oppressors. The first and worst is that they visit you, the second and the better is 
that you visit them, and the third and surest is that you stay far from them, so that 
neither you see them nor they see you.’7
Behind this lay a long-standing conviction that concentrated political power was not 
consonant with Islam. Keane points out that contrary to popular wisdom, Islam was a vital 
element in keeping alive, and redefining, the spirit and substance of democracy after the 
military defeat of Athens (2009: 133). It is only more recently that the ‘Oriental’ autocratic 
state emerged, caused largely by foreign conquest and colonisation, whose effect was ‘to 
maim or destroy the vibrant foundation of social partnerships on which the Islamic empire 
rested’ (Keane 2009: 135).
According to Casanova, al-Ghazali’s sentiment captures the ‘typical and traditional attitude of 
all salvation religions toward the world of politics, and toward the “world” in general’. Of the 
three options al-Ghazali outlines - (i) the state controlling religion; (ii) religion controlling the 
state; and (iii) a separation between religion and the state - the third is the preference of 
religious leaders. Although the second option, theocracy, enables religion to influence and 
shape the world according to God’s ways, it is a perilous option because ‘ultimately all 
theocratic attempts tend to succumb to the paradox of unintended consequences. The more 
religion wants to transform the world in a religious direction, the more religion becomes 
entangled in “worldly” affairs and is transformed by the world’. Consequently, the third 
option - distance, detachment and separation - tends to prevail. It is what both religious and 
worldly people prefer, since it protects the world from religion and religion from the world 
(Casanova 1994: 49).
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Theological arguments that Islam is inherently ‘other-worldly’ and thus incompatible with 
secularism should therefore be treated with skepticism. The institutional form of secularism 
Australia has inherited is not religiously neutral, but rather is intrinsically linked with 
Christianity. Celermajer reminds us that ‘Islam is not the first religion to be decried as 
fundamentally incompatible with secular, democratic progress’. Protestants in nineteenth-
century America labelled their Catholic foes un-American, and used a supposedly natural 
alignment with secularism as a means of excluding their highly religious Catholic rivals. 
Noting the presence of references to Christian values in the discourse of politicians, 
Celermajer concludes that religion in general is not problematic in Australia, but rather Islam 
in particular (2007: 112).
The prejudiced presumption that Islam is an impediment to secularism in Australia should 
therefore be rejected. This dissertation shows why. It argues that we should avoid a unilinear, 
Eurocentric and bigoted conception of secularism, which requires the extinction of religion 
from society or its relegation to the private realm. Muslims communities in Australia are 
supportive of a new form of secularism, religious secularity, whose objective is to foster inter-
religious harmony and social cohesion through the independence of state institutions from 
religious institutions and norms. Although Australian Muslims remain strongly attached to 
religious credo, they have a remarkable capacity to live comfortably in this world, and to 
respect Australia’s secular institutional architecture.
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Presumption #2: Secularism is a necessary condition of modernity
This respect among Muslim communities for the independence of the state from religion has 
gone largely unnoticed, because public and visible manifestations of religion generate the 
perception that Muslims are antithetical to Australia’s modern, secular democracy. The old 
conception of secularism which requires the confinement of religion to the private sphere 
prevails. An appreciation of the history of theories of secularisation is critical to 
understanding the strength of this presumption that the privatisation and decline of religion 
are necessary conditions of modernity. The prevailing social science theory of secularisation 
has its roots in an account of Christianity’s long-term impact on the ‘modern’ European West.
Pioneered in the modern social sciences by Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, sociological 
theories of religion emerged in the early twentieth century which drew a link between the 
trends of modernisation and secularisation, conceived as universal, unidirectional, teleological 
processes of religious decline. Though a connection between religious decline and 
modernisation has been noticed since the Enlightenment, Weber coined the term 
‘secularisation’ in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. He argued that the 
rationalising forces inherent within modern society, Protestantism included, drove modern 
capitalist enterprise, and then ironically that this rationalism became the secularising force 
which ultimately undermined Protestantism itself (1992).
Weber conceived of secularisation as a process of ‘disenchantment’ that involved a shift from 
otherworldliness to this-worldliness. The shift followed three phases of rationalisation. Firstly, 
‘asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into every day life’ and secular economic 
activities acquired the meaning and compulsion of a religious calling. Then, as the religious 
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roots dried out, the irrational compulsion turned into ‘sober economic virtue’ and ‘utilitarian 
worldliness’. Finally, once capitalism ‘rests on mechanical foundations’ it no longer needs 
religious or moral support and begins to penetrate and colonise the religious sphere itself, 
subjecting it to the logic of commodification. Weber lamented the resultant bureaucratic form 
of rationality which characterised the ‘modern’ world; he perceived freedom and 
individualism as being endangered by the meaningless, religionless, kafkaesque rule of 
bureaucratic organisations.
The Protestant Ethic is frequently invoked as inspiration for more recent and comprehensive 
theories of secularisation. Yet Weber did not claim that Protestantism was the sole cause of 
secularisation; in fact, he does not directly confront the question of causal analysis (Moore 
1998: 88). He criticised monocausal explanations of modernity and generally emphasised the 
interpretive quality of all social scientific descriptions of the world. His account is descriptive 
of the relationship between European Christianity and modernisation alone; Weber did not 
seek to generalise his observations into a paradigm that could explain and predict the 
secularising tendencies of modernisation globally. At the close of The Protestant Ethic, Weber 
allowed for the possibility that the process of secularisation might be reversed. He wrote: ‘no 
one knows who will live in this cage [of bureaucracy] in the future, or whether at the end of 
this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth 
of old ideas and ideals’.
Sixty years on, Peter Berger developed Weber’s conception of secularisation, empirically 
examining the causal connection between modernity and secularism. He argued that the rise 
of a modern secularised consciousness was a result of the pluralisation of social worlds. 
Christendom provided ‘a social-structural and a cognitive unity that was lost, probably 
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irretrievably, upon its dissolution at the beginning of the modern age’. We now live in times in 
which ‘discrepant worlds coexist within the same society, contemporaneously challenging 
each other’s cognitive and normative claims’ (Berger 1967: 9). Religion is plunged into a 
crisis of credibility (Swatos and Christiano 1999: 222). Berger argued that as a result of 
modernisation, this pluralisation - and thus secularisation - would become a worldwide 
phenomenon (1967: 12).
While Weber and Berger focused on the impact of secular-rational bureaucratic organisation 
and the new religious pluralism on individual belief, a related theory of secularisation 
originated from the work of Emile Durkheim (1912). Durkheim predicted the loss of the 
central role of religious institutions in society as a result of ‘functional differentiation’ in 
modern industrial societies. Functional differentiation was a process by which specialised 
professionals and organisations (a secular bureaucracy) replaced most of the tasks once 
carried out by the churches. Stripped of their social purpose, Durkheim predicted that the 
importance of religious institutions would eventually fade away in industrial societies. 
More recently, Thomas Luckmann followed Durkheim to observe the marginalisation of 
religion to the private sphere as a result of this functional differentiation. For Luckmann, 
religion became ‘invisible’ in the sense of being an individualised and privatised form of 
salvation, that is irrelevant to the functioning of the primary institutions of modern society 
(1967: 85). Functional differentiation and privatisation were, for Luckmann, processes 
associated with modernity in the Western European context. When a global perspective is 
adopted, however, it becomes clear that a highly visible religion can function alongside ‘the 
primary institutions of modern society’, though there may be a level of separation between 
religion and these institutions. The best known example of this possibility is the rise of the 
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vibrant, expressive, and highly public strand of Christian Pentecostalism  alongside 
functioning liberal democracies in much of North and South America, and to a lesser but 
growing extent in Australia. 
Conceptualising modernity
From these roots, a normative expectation developed that diverse societies inevitably 
‘progress’ towards a singular modernity, defined by the irrelevance of religion. Though Weber 
suggests it, Charles Taylor in A Secular Age (2007) makes explicit the argument that 
secularisation is a process born of Christianity, for Christianity is a self-secularising religion. 
In the form of a detailed narrative, Taylor demonstrates that it was Christianity itself that 
created the conditions for the possibility of secularity and secularisation. Taylor makes this 
point to undermine the argument that universally and globally, processes of modernisation 
necessarily involve religious decline. Alongside Taylor, theorists such as Eisenstadt reject this 
conception of a singular, Western, secular modernity, pointing out that there can be multiple 
modernities. Eisenstadt rightly argues that the hegemonic assumptions that Westernisation and 
modernity are synonymous should be rejected in favour of a conception of modernity which 
recognises a multiplicity of cultural programs (2000: 1-2). 
Desacralising secularisation theory
The most powerful criticisms of secularisation theories note that post-Enlightenment 
philosophers presumed the inevitable decline of religion. Secularisation, from its genesis, was 
not so much a theory as a presupposed and taken-for-granted ideology. Weber and Durkheim 
are representative of a tradition which traced the genealogy of religion to the impotence of 
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primitive humanity in the face of the superior forces of nature; to the first attempts of the 
human mind to understand its own psyche; or to the attempts of the first social groups to 
represent themselves. Religion was therefore seen as either primitive physics (naturism), 
primitive psychology (animism) or primitive sociology (totemism), all of which would 
inevitably be replaced by the corresponding modern scientific paradigms (Casanova 1994: 29; 
Durkheim 1912; Weber 1918). Modernisation was defined by the abolition of the primitivism 
of religion.
Secularisation is problematic when transferred to other world regions with ‘different 
dynamics of structuration of the relations and tensions between religion and the 
world’ (Casanova 2011: 257). For instance, to secularise means ‘to make worldly’, so the 
concept of secularisation can hardly be applied to religions such as Confucianism and Taoism, 
insofar as they are not characterised by high tension with ‘the world’ and have no 
ecclesiastical organisation.
Other persuasive criticisms of secularisation can be loosely grouped into three categories.
1. Secularisation is not a coherent theory, but rather ‘a hodgepodge of loosely employed 
ideas’8
Dobbelaere and Shiner have differentiated respectively three, and six, discrete meanings of 
the term ‘secularisation’. For Shiner, this plurality of meanings is fatal, as several of the 
meanings are infused with polemical and ideological overtones. Abandonment of the 
secularisation theory is seen as the only reasonable solution (1967: 216). However, for 
Dobbelaere, the theory remains useful, despite the confusion this plurality can potentially 
create (1987: 109).
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2. Secularisation theory is unsupported by empirical evidence
As secularisation was self-evident, it did not require careful scrutiny. According to Glock and 
Stark, ‘none of the work done to assess the state of religion in America currently or 
historically meets even the minimum standards of scientific enquiry’ (1965: 84). Hadden 
posits that ‘there is no evidence to support a decisive shift either toward or away from 
religion’ (1989: 18). In fact, the failure of his predictions to eventuate caused a formerly 
prominent secularisation theorist, Peter Berger, to recant his earlier claims. Berger now 
confesses that the secularisation theory ‘has been empirically falsified’ and that ‘contrary to 
the theory, the contemporary world, far from being secularised, is characterised by a veritable 
explosion of passionate religion’ (2007: 20). 
3. New Religious Movements have appeared and persisted in the most supposedly secularised 
societies
The point that secularisation tends to trigger backlashes was made by Stark and Bainbridge, 
who argue that in a free marketplace, new religious organisations will spring abundantly from 
established traditions. Competition encourages religious organisations to adopt market-based 
models, so new spiritual movements tailor their congregations to the needs of a modernised 
population, and attract greater participation (1985: 454).
It is evident from these criticisms that a straightforward narrative of progress from the 
religious to the secular is no longer sufficient to explain the complex dynamics of the modern 
world. Stark (1999) advocates the burial of secularisation in the ‘graveyard of failed theories’, 
on the basis that a reformulated, culturally and empirically sensitive theory of secularisation 
would carry the conceptual baggage of the original theory. However a ‘neo-secularisation’ 
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paradigm has emerged which successfully confronts the critics by developing a global 
perspective. Jose Casanova is at the cutting edge of this counter-trend. He argues that the 
quagmire of the secularisation debate is the result of conceptual confusion. 
Casanova addresses the paradigm’s criticisms by clarifying its central premises in light of the 
resilience of public religions in the modern world. He begins by pointing to three separate 
theses, all of which have been taken, since Weber, to be necessary outcomes of modernity, and 
inseparable elements of the process of secularisation (1994: 19). 
1. Secularisation leads to the progressive shrinkage of religion, especially the declining social 
significance of religious belief, commitment, and institutions.
2. This process leads to the privatisation and marginalisation of religion in the modern world.
3. That societal modernisation entails a differentiation and emancipation of the secular 
spheres - primarily the state, the economy, and science - from the religious spheres.
Casanova argues that only processes 1 and 3 are occurring (1994: 214). He demonstrates that 
the second element, privatisation, is not a modern structural trend, but rather an historical 
option. The proposition that modern differentiation necessarily entails the marginalisation and 
privatisation of religion, and its logical counterpart that public religions necessarily endanger 
the differentiated structures of modernity, has been the primary object of criticism, and is no 
longer defensible (1994: 7). 
The normative expectation that secularisation is an essential civilising process is flawed. Once 
a global perspective is adopted, it becomes clear that the coincidence of these three processes 
in Western Europe is an exceptional phenomenon. In the United States, for example, there is 
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no evidence for the privatisation or decline of religion; yet the separation of state institutions 
from religion is constitutionally mandated. In distinguishing these three processes of 
secularisation, Casanova reveals the potential for variation within secularism as a policy and 
an ideology. Once the normative attachment to all three trends as ‘modernising processes’ is 
removed, the possibility for both the natural evolution and the intentional reshaping of 
policies of secularism, based on the aspirations of a particular society, is revealed.
The impetus for reform
In addition to the potential for reshaping secularism, there is a democratic imperative to 
consider a new secularism which avoids prejudice. There is often great hypocrisy where the 
old secularism prevails. European secularism is a tool for institutionalising intolerance, 
demonstrated by the double standards which exist. In France, the government shuns religious 
symbolism; yet there remains a cross atop the Pantheon, a monument to the country’s 
Christian history, unwittingly revealing the compromises between religion and laïcité that 
shape modern France (Calhoun 2010). Other European states have continued to privilege 
Christianity more overtly, through publicly funding religious schools (often with little 
pretension to neutrality), maintaining church property and clerical salaries, facilitating church 
control of cemeteries, and training the clergy (Bhargava 2010).
The same can be said for Australia. Christianity infiltrates state institutions with little 
resistance. In 1968, Craig McGregor remarked with disdain;
‘the influence of the churches is strong within the community and they form a 
vocal and powerful pressure group at the Government level...they [take] part in 
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attacks upon the academic freedom of universities and from time to time attempt 
to destroy the secular nature of the State education systems’. 
The preamble to the Australian constitution remains overtly religious9, parliamentary prayer 
sanctifies Christian discourses in government, and Christian lobby groups have always had a 
dominant place in the political arena (Maddox 2005). State funding and tax exemption for 
religious schools, aged care, and private hospitals have a long history in Australian society 
(Democrats 2006). 
These observations highlight that public expressions of religiosity have long been condoned, 
well before the Muslim presence was noticed, which prompts the observation that this old 
secularism is biased because it tolerates one public religiosity, as long as it is Christian (Frame 
2006). A rethinking of secularism is in order.
What form of secularism is desirable in a democracy?
What is the ideal relationship between religion and politics in a democratic society? The 
justifications for the new secularism are in democracy: secularism should be the most 
democratic response of the state to religious pluralism. The object of this new secularism 
must be to treat all religions equally, to ensure inter-religious harmony, and to promote social 
cohesion in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society.
Critical to achieving these objectives is freedom for religious individuals and organisations 
not only to worship privately, but to publicly advance their values in civil society and to 
sponsor organisations and movements in political society. In return, religious authorities must 
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tolerate the autonomy and freedom of democratically elected governments from religious 
doctrine. The theorist of democracy and religion Alfred Stepan advocates these dual 
freedoms, or ‘twin tolerations’, as an optimal means of attaining the objectives of religious 
equality, and the most democratic relationship between religion and politics (2001: 217). 
How are these democratic objectives to be operationalised? A new secularism with these goals 
must be a policy directed at the nature of the state and its institutions, rather than at society, 
where it is likely to impair individual freedoms. A secular state should treat all religious and 
non-religious individuals with equal respect; enforce no one religion; and preserve a public 
space for the free exercise and expression of religions. These aspirations require a minimum 
level of differentiation of religious and secular institutions to ensure the even-handedness of 
the state towards diverse religious groups, and foster peaceful relations between them. Strict 
separation of religion from state institutions is both implausible and undesirable; equality may 
be enhanced by the state’s interference in the lives of religious believers to ensure harmony 
and inclusion. Instead, the institutions of a secular state must be free from religious bias, and 
tolerant of the flourishing of religions in the public and private spheres of society.
Public religions can exist in society, alongside differentiated institutions of the state. The 
philosopher Jurgen Habermas (2002) raises concerns that the separation between the religious 
and the secular has gone too far. He develops a discussion of ‘post-secularism’, arguing that 
the democratic public sphere loses the capacity to fully integrate public opinion if it cannot 
include religious voices, that it is deprived of possible creative resources, insights and ethical 
orientations if it is not informed by ideas with roots in religion. Habermas seeks to maintain 
religious insights that may still have liberatory potential, defending a liberalism which admits 
religion fully into public discourse, meanwhile maintaining a secular conception of the state. 
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Casanova takes this argument further, pointing out that public religions can enhance the 
operation of institutional differentiation. Because institutional differentiation can never be 
perfect, he argues that public religions can act as counterfactual normative critiques of 
dominant historical trends. By this he means that due to the difficulties in enforcing 
institutional differentiation, by crossing boundaries and raising questions publicly about the 
separation of the religious and secular spheres, public religions help to scrutinise the 
pretensions of the differentiated spheres to function without regard to moral norms or human 
considerations. At the very least, posits Casanova, public religions may mobilise people 
against such pretensions, contribute to a redrawing of the boundaries, or force a public debate 
on such issues (1994: 40-44).
The implication is that Australia must rethink the relationship between religion, society and 
the state, rejecting the exclusion of religion from the public sphere, and adopting a more 
inclusive model of secularism, compatible with democratic values in a multi-ethnic and multi-
religious society. Secularism and religiosity should be understood as compatible. Islam as a 
public religion is flourishing in Australian society, perhaps undermining outdated, Christian-
centric conceptions of secularism. But in its place will emerge a new form of secularism, 
which might be conceived of as a ‘religious secularity’: a secularism which is comfortable 
with the flourishing of public religions. The result is a situation where the secular state is 
independent from and equitable towards diverse religious and non-religious groups; but where 
those groups exist in, and enrich, the public sphere.
Chapter three takes up this point. It argues that Muslims in Australia accept, promote, and 
adhere to a form of secularism which fits this description. Islam is a public religion in 
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Australian society which shows no sign of declining or retreating to the private sphere, as is 
demonstrated in chapter two. However, chapter three establishes that Australia’s Muslims 
overwhelmingly support the independence of key secular institutions from religious influence.
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CHAPTER TWO 
The flourishing of Islam as a public religion in Australia
The mass movement of people across the globe in the second half of the twentieth-century has 
seen most nations move in a religiously plural direction. Australia is no exception to this 
trend. A recent Pew Global Attitudes survey, widely circulated in the Australian press, 
predicted that Australia’s Muslim community will grow from 399,000 to 714,000 by 2030 - 
an increase of 80% (Warne-Smith 2011). 
These flourishing Muslim communities, in various ways, challenge the status quo in 
Australia. Public rituals draw attention, and outspoken attempts by Muslims to erode 
prejudices often make Muslims a conspicuous feature of the Australian social and political 
landscape. These intrusions of religion into Australia's public sphere are increasingly 
condemned as antithetical to Australia’s secular ethos, making secularism a contentious issue. 
This chapter demonstrates why: among Australian Muslim communities, religion remains a 
potent, visible and socially significant force. 
To grasp the scale of Muslim migration, the chapter begins with a reading of the history of 
Muslims in Australia. It is also important to take from this history a sense of the incredible 
diversity of Muslims in modern Australia, as well as an understanding of the unintended and 
unforeseen nature of this cultural and religious heterogeneity. Through the appreciation of 
prejudices which accompanied this long history, chapter moves to an analysis of the present 
situation of Muslim communities in Australia, and their persistent public religiosity. It notices 
how this quintessential public religion challenges the pretenses of Australian society to 
impartiality towards different religious groups. 
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History of Muslims in Australia
Australia’s first Muslim visitors were Makassar fishermen from Sulawesi, who visited the 
northern coasts to collect trepang from at least 1720, possibly earlier. Whilst the fishermen 
did leave a linguistic and genetic mark in remote northern regions, the first lasting religious 
presence arrived with the Afghan camel drivers, introduced to Australia by some of the 
earliest European settlers. Racial vilification was commonplace, prompted by a perception 
that Afghans were undercutting wages and stealing jobs (Kabir 2004: 43). In 1892 a group 
calling itself the ‘Charleville Camelphobists’ attracted unemployed protestors in a campaign 
to rid Australia of the Afghan presence (Kabir 2004: 48). This was despite the fact that the 
total Afghan population never exceeded a few hundred by some estimates, or a few thousand 
by others (Kabir 2004: 50; Stevens 1993: 49). Though mosques were constructed in Perth, 
Adelaide, Broken Hill, and Brisbane from 1890-1907, the Afghans largely evaded religious 
prejudice, as mosques were confined to segregated Ghantowns (Kabir 2004: 70). 
The Immigration Restriction Act 1901, the primary institutional vehicle of the White Australia 
Policy, reduced the flow of Afghans substantially. However, the Muslim population steadily 
grew due to migration of Muslims of European appearance or perceived European ethnicity: 
Ottoman Turks, Albanians in the 1920s and 1930s, and later Bosnians. Yet in total, Australia 
was only home to between 2000 and 4000 Muslims from 1911 to 1947. It was not until World 
War II ended that the demographic revolution of Australia’s religious landscape began.
In 1945, Australia’s religious composition was relatively stable and homogenous. Anglicans 
dominated the landscape, forming 39% of the population. Catholics were a sizable minority, 
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and there were smaller numbers of Methodists and Presbyterians. Since the end of World War 
II, Australia’s religious fabric has been transformed. This was not intentional; little attention 
was paid by policymakers to the resulting religious diversity. The architect of the 
transformation, Minister for Immigration Arthur Calwell, was attempting to avert what was 
seen as an economic and national security crisis through an ambitious immigration program. 
Whilst the social implications of such large-scale immigration were considered, it was colour 
rather than religion that was the visible and decisive factor in manipulating the cultural 
composition of Australia. 
Australia’s geographical isolation from its allies, the vulnerability of a small population and 
the lingering wartime threat from Japan led to the perception that without rapid expansion, 
Australians could not defend the vast land they occupied from Asian invasion. Meanwhile, 
economists advised that without rapid population increase a higher standard of living was 
unachievable. The Government promoted its new immigration policy under the banner 
‘Populate or Perish!’. British migrants were preferred to preserve cultural homogeneity, and 
were offered assisted passages. However, given the scale of the immigration program (and 
with fewer British citizens volunteering than expected), the government was compelled to 
widen its selection criteria. 
In 1947, the government agreed to accept 12,000 displaced Europeans each year, and 
committed to select refugees without discrimination of race or religion. In reality there was an 
ethnic pecking order, with a blanket ban on Jews, and blonde and blue-eyed Baltic people 
preferred. By 1954 Australia had received 170,000 displaced persons, bringing a plethora of 
new religious groups into the country. Among these refugees were the first substantial intake 
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of Muslims from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland, Hungary and Russia (Lack and 
Templeton 1995: 10). 
As European economies began to recover and its refugee camps emptied, the flow of migrants 
dried up. Assisted passages were extended beyond Britain to other European countries. This 
was justified by Immigration Minister Harold Holt on the grounds of national security and 
economic development, with the assurance that these ‘new Australians’ would smoothly and 
speedily assimilate: ‘The British...are a mixture of races. Australia, in accepting a balanced 
intake of other European people as well as British, can still build a truly British nation on this 
side of the world’ (Lack and Templeton 1995: 14). The most desired nationalities were chosen 
first: agreements were signed with Italy and Holland in 1951, then with West Germany, 
Greece and Austria in 1952. In the late 1960s, when southern and eastern European 
emigration slowed due to economic prosperity at home, agreements were signed with Syria 
and Turkey (Jones 1993a: 94). In the early 1970s assisted passages were extended to the 
Lebanese, who were eager to leave their conflict-ridden homeland. Other Muslims continued 
to arrive as unassisted migrants or as refugees. 
Colour, rather than race or religion, remained the driving factor behind immigration policy. 
The Lebanese case highlights the fact that White Australia was based on physical appearance 
rather than geographical origin - or religion. Whilst Lebanon is more Middle Eastern than 
European, and not majority Christian, the Lebanese were of ‘European appearance’, and by 
1981 Australia had received around 16,500 Lebanese-born Muslims (Jones 1993a: 94). In 
contrast, Indians who were part of the British Empire, were excluded based upon their colour 
(Jupp 1991: 51). 
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Immigration policy appeared to be loosening. Yet the original purpose of retaining the 
homogenous cultural composition of Australia as a bulwark against Asian invasion remained. 
The Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 continued to operate as a formal tool of 
assimilation. British citizens could simply register for citizenship after twelve months 
residence, where Europeans faced a five year qualifying period, and were compelled to 
renounce previous allegiances at naturalisation ceremonies. Non-Europeans were not 
permitted to be naturalised. Ironically, whilst the Act forced new Australians to place 
allegiance to Australia over all others, the necessary implication of the naturalisation of these 
migrants was that they became entitled to the freedoms which citizens possessed: freedom of 
expression, of association, and importantly freedom of religion. Whilst purporting to be a tool 
of assimilation, the Act essentially codified the rights to difference which citizenship implies. 
By 1972 the White Australia Policy was coming under increasing international and domestic 
criticism. With the fall of Saigon in 1975, Australia saw the arrival of several waves of ‘boat 
people’: refugees arriving on small craft from Indochina. The Buddhist religion of the new 
Indochinese community was virtually ignored amid the racially-based intolerance. 
Nevertheless, these immigrants brought with them their religion, and formed the demographic 
basis for a significant Buddhist community in Australia (Hinnells 2007, 179). Meanwhile, 
immigration from Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Oceania between 1976 and 1986 saw the 
Muslim community more than double (Jones 1993a: 94). By 1996, there were over 200,000 
Muslims living in Australia. 
The gradual racial liberalisation of the nation’s immigration policies had the unintended 
consequence of transforming Australia’s religious landscape. Until relatively recently, the 
Muslim presence in Australia went largely unnoticed by the general public, the media, and 
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policymakers. In 1987 Michael Humphrey wrote that ‘since Australia is a secular state and 
religion is treated as a personal matter, the role of religion in the political arena has largely 
been ignored’ (1987: 233). Such a statement would, today, be ludicrous. A series of events 
occurred, probably beginning in the 1990s but certainly climaxing with the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, which altered the public discourse from concern with race to a fixation 
on religion. Australia’s involvement in the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, the arrival of unauthorised 
refugees, as well as the rise of militant Islamist groups in the 1990s, caused Muslims as a 
religious group to be targeted for discrimination. The September 11 terrorist attack, perceived 
as religiously motivated and deepening the characterisation of Islam as a violent and other-
worldly religion, heightened the religious focus of Australia’s immigration debate (Brown 
2011). 
An age-old controversy re-entered the public consciousness with renewed vigour. 
Commentators and individuals began to ask in large numbers, ‘is Islam compatible with 
secularism, and hence democracy?’ Samuel Huntington popularised the negative perspective; 
after the terrorist attacks he became ‘a prophet of sorts’ (Kepel 2011). Adopting the 
catchphrase ‘the clash of civilizations’, Huntington reinvigorated the historical Orientalist 
presumption that Muslim peoples are resistant to, or even inherently incompatible with, 
secularism, democracy and modernity.
Muslims, conceived as an homogenous group with religion as the defining characteristic, 
were accused of being unable to culturally assimilate. The Bali terrorist episode, in which 
more than 80 Australians were killed, strengthened these attitudes (Houlihan 2005; Morris 
2003a). Mosques were attacked, and abuse of veiled women became commonplace. Phone-in 
radio shows, where bigotry flourishes, were flooded with anti-Muslim calls (Economist 
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2002). However it was the London bombings of July 2005, carried out by ‘homegrown‘ 
terrorists which led to some of the most fervent vilification of Australian Muslims, due to a 
perception that Australian citizens were potential terrorists (Jupp 2006). At the end of 2005, 
sectarian riots broke out around Cronulla beach in Sydney’s south. Religion became a focal 
point of the public debate, and Muslims was firmly associated with extremism in the 
Australian consciousness. By this stage, around 400,000 Australians identified as Muslim. 
The escalating public awareness about religion in general, and specifically about the presence 
of Muslims in Australia, is exemplified in the discourse of populist politician Pauline Hanson. 
Best known for her 1996 maiden speech to parliament, vilifying Asians, by 2007 Hanson had 
shifted her tone from racially to religiously charged, calling for a moratorium on Muslim 
immigration (Ho 2007; S Poynting 2006). 
Today, we face deep-seated prejudices in Australian society as a consequence the misplaced 
presumptions about Muslims and Islam outlined in chapter one. They usually rest upon two 
observable features of Australian Muslim communities, to which the remainder of this chapter 
now turns: Muslims in Australia remain a highly religious group, and Muslim communities 
are a conspicuous feature of Australia’s religious and political landscape. In the coming pages, 
evidence is assembled to show that despite the prolonged presence of Muslims in Australia, 
there is no sign of a withering away of religious beliefs and practices in Muslim communities, 
nor of religion’s retreat into the private sphere. 
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The public religiosity of Australian Muslim communities
Australia’s Muslims show little sign of ‘losing their religion’, a trend which has been 
observed amongst the Australian population at large (Frame 2009). In fact, the experience of 
migration has, for many Muslims, prompted a deepening of religiosity. 
Migration has been called a ‘theologising experience’ (Smith 1978: 1175). Attachment to 
religious organisations, beliefs and practices can increase as some immigrants use these to 
remind them of their origins, to distinguish themselves from other Australians and to help 
provide meaning, social support and community in the settlement process (G. D. Bouma 
1994: 80). For Muslims in particular, travel, whether in the form of inner spiritual journeys or 
pilgrimages, is directed towards achieving greater religious consciousness (Humphrey 2005: 
137). 
Bouma, Daw and Munawar found in their interviews that it is not unusual for Muslims to say 
that they learn more about Islam after migrating to Australia. One interviewee said:
‘I was not a religious person when I arrived in Australia. As the children grew up 
and the Pakistani community increased I also experienced an awakening of 
religious fervour...I reverted back to my cultural dress and became regular in my 
prayers...I even started arranging milad [a religious celebration] at my place once 
a month’ (2001: 70).
Respondents reported that their practice in the homeland was ‘automatic’ or ‘unreflective’, 
whereas migration brought a new depth to their faith and religious practice became more 
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regular (G. Bouma et al. 2001: 69; Munawar 1997). Religion provided a sense of security and 
protection, through feelings of satisfaction and serenity during a time of uncertainty and 
change (2001: 69). This manifested in increased mosque attendance, wearing of the hijab and 
keeping dietary regulations among Muslim women in Australia (2001: 70). 
The few quantitative studies which measure religiosity confirm its persistence amongst 
Australian Muslim communities. A comparative analysis of three primary sources of data 
demonstrates that all participants were overwhelmingly likely to pray regularly (see Table 1). 
In a recent and comprehensive survey of 307 Australian-born Lebanese and Turkish youth, 
Christine Inglis (2010: 149) found that around 73% of participants prayed at least weekly.10 In 
an older study, Bouma (1994) noted that more participants felt an increase in their religion 
than a decrease, although most perceived no change. Hassan (2002), in a survey of 78 Muslim 
residents of metropolitan Adelaide, reported that over three-quarters of respondents prayed at 
least five times daily.11
Frequency of prayer (%) Inglis (2010) Bouma (1994) Hassan (2002)
Once daily 15.9 3.9
Twice daily 5.2
Three times daily 2.6
Four times daily 1.3
Five times daily or more 43.8 77.9
More than weekly 70.8
Once a week 12.4 20.8
Only on Sundays 1.3
Monthly 8.3
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Frequency of prayer (%) Inglis (2010) Bouma (1994) Hassan (2002)
Only on special occasions/
religious holidays
19.4 1.3
Occasionally 6.5
Never 8.5 0.0
Change: big increase 6.0
Change: increase 26.9
Change: no change 53.7
Change: decrease 13.4
Figure 2: Frequency of prayer (table)
That Australia’s Muslim population is more religiously devout than the general Australian 
population is not an especially contentious claim. The approximations of some informed 
members of the Muslim community support this appraisal. Ramzi Elsayed, president of the 
Islamic Council of Victoria, estimates that 30 percent of Australian Muslims are currently 
practicing Islam (Roose 2010). Abdullah Saeed, who has studied Australian Muslims for over 
twenty years, makes an educated guess that ‘30 to 40 percent of Muslims’ could be defined as 
‘fully committed to Islam and interested in manifesting Islamic ideas, values and practices in 
their lives’, whilst another 30 to 40 percent of Muslims probably fall into the category of ‘not 
particularly interested in being religious’ and seeing ‘Islam merely as an aspect of their 
cultural identification rather than a living faith that they practice’ (Saeed 2003: 71). The 
remainder are believing, though not especially devout, Muslims. These figures are substantial 
relative to the number of practicing Christians. Churchgoing in Australia has been on the 
steady decline for decades, with figures at around 10 percent (2 million) and dropping, 
according to the Christian Research Association (Hughes 2006).
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Although this personal and private religiosity is of interest, because it demonstrates that Islam 
is unlikely to disappear in Australia, of greater consequence are the public manifestations of 
that religiosity. Although practices vary substantially among Muslim communities, Islam is a 
ritual-rich religion, and those rituals are often highly visible in the public sphere. The focus of 
the next section is on two key forms of public religiosity which have recently generated the 
most vigorous debates: the prominence of religious symbols and rituals in public spaces, and 
public attempts by Muslim individuals and groups to dispel prejudices within the Australian 
community.
Public religious symbols
Figure 3: an artist in Sydney’s Inner West publicly calls for a ban of the ‘burqa’
Islam is the quintessential ‘public religion’ in Australia. No symbol of Islam has generated 
more heated debate than the hijab, or ‘headscarf’. Whilst hostility is predominantly reserved 
for women wearing the burqa or niqab, most Australian Muslim women continue to wear 
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some form of the hijab, conspicuously setting them apart from non-Muslims. Inglis indicates 
that two thirds of Australian Lebanese women, and 29 percent of Australian Turkish women, 
cover their head (2010: 149). In a survey of participants at an Eid festival in Brisbane, Rane et 
al found that half of the respondents believed that Muslim women should wear the hijab in 
some form (2010: 5). The greatest vilification of conspicuously Muslim women occurred 
during the Cronulla riots in 2005, but recent laws banning full head coverings in Europe have 
reignited the debate.
The most recent calls to ‘ban the burqa’ appeared in the NSW Parliament after the arrest, 
conviction, and successful appeal of the Muslim woman Carnita Matthews for falsely 
accusing a police officer of ripping off her hijab during a traffic stop (McGovern and 
Fishwick 2011). In response to the overturn of her conviction, a media frenzy about the threat 
of Islam and specifically the ‘burqa’ to national security was unleashed. Though some uphold 
these justifications for objecting to the hijab, what is far more plausible is that the symbolism 
is rejected because the garment has become the most salient, contested and controversial 
emblem of contemporary global Islam (Casanova 2009a: 23). It is an expression of a 
stubbornly public religion. Liberal MP Bronwyn Bishop reflected this sentiment when she 
demanded that the government ban the headscarf from public schools. She argued that the 
headscarf was ‘not just a headscarf’, but an ‘iconic item of defiance’, and that it represented 
‘a clash of cultures’ and ‘a challenge to our freedoms and way of life’ (2005). 
The mosque is a second contested public symbol of the growing Muslim presence in 
Australia. Inglis reports that most Muslims are likely attend mosque at least monthly, with 
37% of Lebanese and 22% of Turkish Muslim participants attending once a week or more 
(2010: 149). The construction of mosques has attracted considerable criticism from local 
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communities. Humphrey describes the ‘organic’ construction process which characterised 
much of the Muslim history in Australia, whereby community meeting halls often evolved 
into temporary prayer halls and became official mosques (2005: 136). The gradual 
development of Muslim institutions by local ethnic communities frequently gave rise to a 
perception by suburban communities that Australian suburbs were being invaded by an 
unfamiliar and perhaps hostile religion. When residents of Annangrove in suburban Sydney 
appealed to the Land and Environment Court against the local development of a prayer centre 
for the local Indian Shi’ite community, they argued that ‘holy war’ had been declared against 
the residents who opposed the centre (Humphrey 2005: 136). Some residents are disturbed by 
the public broadcast of the call to prayer; others apprehensive after seeing images in the 
global and local media of hundreds of Muslims spilling onto the streets during prayer times, 
creating a public spectacle. Disgruntled communities are often further perturbed by overseas 
funding which is often received for the building of mosques. The Turkish government’s 
mosque-building program, for instance, entrenched for some the perception of Islam as a 
transnational religion whose adherents could not be loyal to Australia.
Deliberate attempts to advance a positive impression of Islam
 
Figure 4: ‘Jesus, a prophet of Islam’ billboard
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Usually in reaction to the unbalanced focus on negative portrayals of Muslims, attempts are 
made by Muslims to publicly advance a positive debate on Islam. One example of this is the 
recent endeavour of the Muslim group MyPeace at interfaith dialogue in a billboard (pictured 
above), which had the opposite effect to that intended. The organiser, MyPeace founder Diaa 
Mohamed, said that the signs were a response to misunderstandings about Islam and 
vilification of Muslims (McKenny 2011). The three signs around Sydney have been 
vandalised numerous times, and Mr. Mohamed has received several offensive phone calls 
(Hall 2011). The billboard was the subject of a series of complaints to the Advertising 
Standards Bureau, on the grounds that the statement was insulting to Christians, and that 
Jesus ‘must not be associated with such [an] aggressive religion’ (McKenny 2011). 
Other instances of public outspokenness are readily found in the deliberate engagement in 
mainstream creative industries by Australian Muslims. These include works of fiction by 
Randa Abdel-Fattah, Hanifa Deen and Irfan Yusuf, Salam Cafe on SBS, and the music of the 
Muslim hip-hop outfit, The Brothahood. Peta Stephenson (2010) documents the phenomenon 
of often younger, Australian-born Muslims reinterpreting and mediating their religious and 
cultural identities through a creative lens. This form of public engagement attempts to 
normalise the Muslim religious identity and demonstrate its compatibility with Australian-
ness. It does not proselytise, but nor does it ignore religion. One episode of Salam Cafe 
features the prominent Muslim commentator Waleed Aly asking a woman ‘Do you know what 
Ramadan is?’, to which she responds ‘is it the same as a pappadam?’ The point is, whether 
through deliberate outspokenness of individuals or groups endeavouring to project a more 
positive image of Islam, or through Muslims unwittingly gaining attention through adherence 
to religious practices, Muslims are a pronounced element of Australia’s public sphere. 
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Figure 5: Salam Cafe, SBS
From this evidence emerges a complex picture. The traditional Australian apathy towards 
religion and secularism has been disrupted by the growing and conspicuous Muslim presence. 
It is clear that far from withering away, Muslims remain an enduring element of Australia’s 
religious landscape. The conspicuous presence of Islam in public spaces, combined with the 
deep-seated and persistent religiosity of the community, reinforces the view that Islam 
obstructs processes of secularisation, and therefore that the growing Muslim population 
endangers Australian secularism. Chapter three argues that the secular ethos of Australian 
society remains unthreatened, because there is broad acceptance within Australian Muslim 
communities of the need for differentiation of religious and secular institutions. This is key to 
the new secularism proposed by this dissertation.
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CHAPTER THREE
Differentiated institutions
The process of institutional differentiation noticed by Durkheim involved the emancipation of 
secular institutions from ecclesiastical control. In twentieth-century Australia, it refers to a 
level of freedom of secular institutions from religious norms. We have already noted that 
institutional differentiation cannot be absolute. Instead, a sufficient level of separation 
between religion and state institutions must be respected to ensure the equal treatment of 
religions by those institutions. This chapter demonstrates, contrary to popular perceptions, 
that this separation is respected by Muslim communities. 
Apprehension about the growing Muslim presence in Australian society has generated 
speculation that Muslims will either establish parallel religious or political institutions, or 
infect secular Australian institutions with religious principles. Such fears are based upon the 
presumptions outlined in chapter one: that Islam is inherently political and other-worldly, and 
that religious decline, privatisation and institutional differentiation go hand in hand, so that a 
religion which is flourishing publicly necessarily undermines processes of institutional 
differentiation. This chapter challenges this dominant discourse by examining three particular 
institutions: the legal, educational and political systems. 
Firstly, there exists a belief that Muslims, because of a unique religious requirement that 
religious ‘laws’ permeate all facets of worldly life, overwhelmingly advocate the supremacy 
of divine law over secular, human law (Zwartz 2007). Bill Muehlenberg, a commentator in 
Quadrant recently argued that shari’a is ‘creeping’ into Australian law, and if it does not stop 
we will end up ‘with only one legal system: sharia law’. This will lead to a new segregation, 
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with Westerners who do not embrace the totalist Islamist agenda being turned into second 
class citizens, or ‘dhimmis’ (2011a). These views are reinforced by the use of the Arabic term 
‘shari’a’ to ideologically reify Muslims and their laws as the ‘Other’ (Salaymeh 2011). It 
obfuscates the distinct varieties of Islamic law that exist in codified form. By definition 
shari’a requires ijtihad, or interpretation, and codifications by states like Iran and Saudi 
Arabia reflect not just Islam, but also the history and culture of their societies (Aslam 2006: 
865). Nevertheless, thanks to abundant misrepresentations by the press, the term ‘shari’a’ 
conjures images of stoning, amputations, public executions and the oppression of women.
Secondly, a widespread perception exists that Muslims are deliberately forging a separate 
community, and resisting assimilation by fusing religious and secular education. In the 
Western European process of functional differentiation observed by Durkheim, responsibility 
for education passed from religious institutions to the state. These state-operated schools 
became increasingly based on rational, secular principles. Religion-based schooling has a 
long history in Australia, with state funding available for all religious schools. Yet there exists 
a perception that the education of Muslims in Islamic schools isolates these children from 
Australian society, reinforcing differences, fostering resentment and entrenching a defiant 
religiosity. Islamic religious education is thought by many commentators to be the most 
important source of anti-Western attitudes among Muslims, perhaps even serving as a 
breeding ground for terrorism and violence (Saeed 2005: 63). Muehlenberg even argues that 
Australia is undergoing a process of ‘Islamisation’, due to the funding of Islamic schools, the 
implementation of Muslim religious instruction in state schools, and the failure to ban Islamic 
dress in these schools (2011b).
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Thirdly, elected Muslim representatives within the Australian political system have been 
accused of inappropriately representing religious beliefs rather than geographical 
constituencies. In 2010 in the NSW Parliament, Labor MP Tony Stewart denounced the 
Lebanese Muslim Association for undermining Australian democracy by running its own 
candidate at the State election (Parliament 2011). Stewart was ‘perplexed’, because he felt 
that the LMA is undermining the principle that Australian governments represent ‘the people’, 
not religious faiths. This chapter demonstrates that these fears and accusations are unfounded. 
It concludes that there is overwhelming support for a new secularism which requires the 
exclusion of religion from secular institutions.
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
Shari’a politics
The Australian anthropologist Ghassan Hage identified the fear of an alien legal system 
operating in Australia as the primary source of objections to public displays of Muslim 
religiosity. For Hage, Australians are confronted by the hijab not because it is a source of 
cultural otherness, but rather because it symbolises the threat that the law of the ‘other’ will be 
imposed upon Australian law (2008).
The perception that Muslim communities threaten the separation of religious principles from 
secular law in Australia is flawed. It is usually based upon two misleading presumptions: (i) 
that to conform to shari’a undermines or violates the secular legal system, and (ii) that the 
implementation of all shari’a principles has widespread support among Australia’s Muslims. 
This section argues, contrary to common perceptions, that in most cases shari’a and secular 
law can coexist; and that the aspects of shari’a which cannot conform to Australian law gain 
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little mainstream support within Australian Muslim communities. It is clear that these 
communities overwhelmingly respect the freedom of secular legal institutions from religious 
influence. 
Public debate on the place of religious laws and principles in Australian society is usually 
based upon the misplaced assumption that Islamic and secular legal systems cannot coexist. 
This is exemplified by the recent exchange between the president of the Australian Federation 
of Islamic Councils, Ikebal Patel, and Attorney-General Robert McClelland. Patel, in a 
submission to the parliamentary enquiry on multiculturalism, voiced support for ‘legal 
pluralism’, including tentatively advocating the introduction of shari’a arbitration bodies. He 
emphasised that shari’a can be applied in a way that complies with Australian law. The 
Attorney-General responded by stating that there ‘is no place for sharia law in Australian 
society and the Government strongly rejects any proposal for its introduction...Australia’s 
brand of multiculturalism promotes integration. If there is any inconsistency between cultural 
values and the rule of law then Australian law wins out’ (Karvelas 2011b, my italics). This 
exchange reveals the toxic misrepresentations that exist within the shari’a debate. The 
Attorney-General’s statement is almost oxymoronic. He states that there is no place for 
shari’a, but in the next sentence reveals that there is a place for cultural values, usually 
comprised of shari’a principles, so long as they are consistent with the rule of Australian law. 
Patel later retracted his contentions, largely due to pressure and criticism from within the 
Muslim communities, including the state-based Islamic Councils, which had no input into this 
request (Merritt 2011a). Though Patel had never intended to imply the subordination of civil 
law to religious law, the meaning of his submission was misinterpreted. He later said he 
supported secular law and it had been a mistake to even mention legal pluralism. He 
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emphasised that shari’a dictates that Muslims in non-Muslim societies must respect the law 
of the country (Merritt 2011a).
Muslims for more than a century have worked, studied, raised families, worshipped and lived 
their lives in accordance with the tenets of Islam whilst also adhering to Australian law (Black 
and Sadiq 2011: 83). Fears of Muslim communities’ ‘hidden agenda’ to create a parallel legal 
system ignore the fact that other religious groups have observed their religious laws 
harmoniously alongside civil processes in Australia for centuries without substantial 
opposition (Buckley 2010: 98; Muehlenberg 2011b). 
There exists an unfounded assumption that where institutions exist (such as halal butchers, or 
private bodies for resolving disputes between consenting Muslims) which conform by choice 
to shari’a principles, this constitutes the imposition of a parallel legal system in Australia. 
This involves a fundamental misunderstanding of legal principles. Instead, when behaviour 
exists which conforms to more than one legal system, we should speak of ‘legal pluralism’, 
not in the juristic or formal sense of separate courts, but in the social science sense where 
official and unofficial, dominant and subordinate forms of law coexist. It is only where 
inconsistencies arise between Australian law and these practices which conform to shari’a 
principles or where there is an enforcement of shari’a principles upon unconsenting 
individuals that one can speak of the creation of a ‘parallel legal system’.
In a recent Sydney Morning Herald article entitled ‘What is Sharia?’, the legal scholar Jamila 
Hussain wrote that ‘for the most part, if you live in Australia, you can still obey sharia 
because there is very little conflict. That is something that a lot of the media and politicians 
simply do not get’ (Kwek 2011). Accusations of unwillingness to participate in secular legal 
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institutions ignore the many ways in which Muslim communities have already found space to 
observe their own customs within the Australian legal system. Muslims submit themselves to 
Australian law when they obtain state authorisation of Islamic marriage celebrants; organise 
visas for imams from overseas; obtain permission to bury their dead according to Muslim 
burial rites; contest misrepresentations about Islamic culture and practice; establish Islamic 
schools; and expand the role of Islamic welfare with the privatisation of government welfare 
(Humphrey 2001: 41). Practising Islam in conformity with the existing legal framework can 
be seen, for example, in development applications for mosques and Islamic schools in the 
Local Council and the Land and Environment Court; the discussion of religious law in the 
Family Law Council and the Australian Law Reform Commission; and the recruitment of 
imams in the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Humphrey 2001: 41).12
Family law: marriage and divorce
The most contentious aspect of the shari’a debate in Australia relates to family law. 
According to Black and Sadiq (2011), this is what mainstream Australian discourse perceives 
as ‘bad shari’a’. This section examines the compatibility of Islamic marriage and divorce law 
with both Australian law, and Australian norms of gender equality.
Marriage
It is possible for Muslims to comply with both the Marriage Act and Islamic law when they 
wish to wed (Hussain 2001: 163). Imams may be appointed as celebrants, and there are no 
stringent requirements as to the form of the ceremony. The desire of a minority of Muslims 
for polygamous marriages has posed a far greater issue. Under shari’a, polygamous marriages 
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are allowed only in exceptional circumstances, which differ according to particular 
interpretations of Islamic law. A few men have contracted polygamous marriages in Australia 
through a religious ceremony which is not recognised as a legal marriage under Australian 
law, but is rather considered a de facto relationship (Hussain 2001: 169). Since there is no 
legal obstacle to a person living with a married spouse and a de facto partner, there is no 
inherent conflict with Australian law. Yet this is seen by some as violating Australian 
principles of gender equality, because polygamy is a privilege accorded only to men. 
However there has been a push from Muslim feminists to challenge common interpretations 
of Islamic law. Much of the gender inequality which is perceived in shari’a principles draws 
upon the interpretations forged within economically underdeveloped countries with 
patriarchal histories and cultures. As there is no ‘essential’ or ‘pure’ shari’a, it is susceptible 
to reform through reinterpretation of Islamic texts. Muslim feminists and modernist scholars 
have scrutinised Islamic family law texts, and have concluded that the predominantly male 
jurists who developed these laws from the tenth to the twelfth century did so in ways that 
reflect the gendered roles and expectations existing at their time (Buckley 2010: 83). Yvonne 
Haddad notes that the migration experience to the West can empower Muslim women to 
question these gender norms, and the validity they draw from Islamic texts (2005: 115). 
Divorce
In Islamic law, divorce has always been permitted, though it is ‘the thing most hated in the 
eyes of God’ (Hussain 2001: 175). Only men may exercise the right of talaq, divorcing the 
wife by the pronouncement of the word ‘talaq’ three times. This is seen by some as 
discriminatory towards women, who do not possess this right. Women are only able to 
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divorce their husbands by making an application to the court. They can ‘buy’ their divorce by 
returning their mahr to the husband, or they can establish that their husband is guilty of 
desertion, failure to maintain them, cruelty or other grounds allowed by shari’a, the court may 
grant them a divorce (Hussain 2001: 176).13
Under Australian law, the irretrievable breakdown of marriage, evidenced by twelve months 
separation, are the only grounds for divorce. Whilst most Muslim women can comply with 
these criteria, and obtain a legal divorce, Muslim communities will not recognise the divorce 
unless they also comply with shari’a. Whilst this does not pose a problem for men (as they 
can simply pronounce talaq), women have no recourse to a shari’a court in Australia to obtain 
a religious divorce. This has also posed a considerable problem for women in the Jewish 
community (Hussain 2001: 176), with husbands taking advantage of gaps between the civil 
and religious systems to deny wives a religious divorce while granting them a civil one 
(Buckley 2010: 95). 
Thus, ironically, Muslim women in Australia can often be placed in a more difficult position 
in relation to divorce than their counterparts in Muslim countries, because there are no official 
bodies which can arbitrate disputes under religious law (Buckley 2010: 90-91; Jamal 2007). 
The resulting dilemma of ‘limping marriages’ has led some Muslim leaders to put forward 
proposals for reform, which usually involve establishing systems within the Australian law to 
facilitate conformity with shari’a practices. Such measures are both in the interests of 
Australian Muslim communities, and in the interests of gender equality. However they have 
been met with great resistance, as ‘shari’a has no place within the Australian legal 
system’ (Merritt 2011b). 
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Two prominent options are (i) the creation of religious authority bodies that advise Muslims 
on the Islamic family law process; and (ii) the changing of secular legislation to recognise 
Islamic divorce procedures (Buckley 2010: 95-96). The first proposal involves no violation of 
or change to secular law, but merely the creation of religious advisory bodies (similar to the 
Beth Dins founded by Jewish communities). Since individual imams have long been 
consulted for advice and decisions regarding divorce, and have been able to persuade 
husbands to divorce their wives through talaq, clearly the better option for women would be 
to have available a local religious authority, which can grant an Islamic divorce. These bodies 
have been variously called the ‘Shari’ah councils’ (Britain), the Australian National Imams 
Council (Australia) and Islamic arbitration councils (Canada). Whilst the Canadian arbitration 
councils have been recognised under the existing family law system, the British and 
Australian models operate outside the formal system in an extra-judicial sense (Buckley 2010: 
96).
Ghena Krayem (2010: 117-18) argues that a demand for these bodies should not be perceived 
to be a separatist one, in that it does not require a parallel legal system to be set up that 
operates alongside the mainstream legal system. She notes that in the UK context, when 
Muslims have asked for such accommodation, it has been in the context of fitting into - and 
not replacing - the alternative dispute resolution system already in place in the family law 
arena. As Lord Phillips (Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales) emphasised, ‘it is [already] 
possible for those who are entering into a contractual agreement to agree that the agreement 
shall be governed by a law other than English law’, and the use of Islamic family law with the 
consent of both parties is no different (2008: 9). This is confirmed by the UK Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal, which states its purpose as to resolve family law disputes in harmony 
with both UK law and shari’a.14 The tribunal achieves this by including at least one scholar of 
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Islamic law and one solicitor or barrister registered to practice in England or Wales. 
Unfortunately, proposals to introduce these religious advisory bodies have so far encountered 
great hostility in Australia (Bibby 2010; Hole 2011; Karvelas 2011a; Namazie 2011).
The second measure to address the dilemma of ‘limping marriages’ involves the amendment 
of secular laws to account for religious considerations. The Australian Law Reform 
Commission recommended such a measure in 1992, publishing a report on multiculturalism 
and family law. The ALRC proposed granting courts the ability to withhold a civil divorce if 
the applicant had not done enough to remove any religious barriers to their spouse’s 
remarriage. However the Family Law Council decided that the Family Law Act should not be 
amended or reformed (Buckley 2010: 97). Whilst some may interpret this push for minor 
legal reform as undermining the differentiation of secular legal institutions from religious 
institutions, it actually lies within the scope of secularism, vis-a-vis the mutual respect and 
toleration of secular practices by religious groups. It is likely to enhance the standing and 
equality of Muslim women, and is therefore consonant with ‘Australian values’ of gender 
equality. 
Contrary to media accusations, such measures have only been endorsed by a minority of 
Australian Muslims. The support among Muslim representative bodies for these requests is 
volatile and mixed. The Muslim Women’s National Network of Australia supports the 
establishment of Shari’a Councils, while the Islamic Women’s Welfare Council of Victoria 
has rejected the idea (Buckley 2010: 98). 
Certainly, no prominent Muslim body is advocating the enforcement of shari’a principles on 
either Muslims or non-Muslims in Australia. Where shari’a ‘courts’ have been established 
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overseas, such as in the UK, they make judgments only with respect to consenting individuals 
who have chosen not to use the civil court system. They operate within British law, and there 
is an appeal process by which decisions of these Muslim bodies are reviewable by civil 
courts. As Krayem argues, ‘it is not about creating a separate legal system but about allowing 
such minority groups to be better accommodated in the existing institutions and legal 
structures’ (2010: 118). She goes on to emphasise that Muslims are not seeking an 
enforcement or official recognition of shari’a: ‘there is no evidence to suggest that any 
proposal has been put forward for any multicultural state to recognise the content of Islamic 
law within its legal system. To do this would be to involve the state in matters of religion and 
its interpretation’ (Krayem 2010: 118). As there is no universal interpretation of shari’a 
principles, inevitably controversies would arise. This brings us back to the main point of this 
thesis: both religious and worldly people tend to prefer institutional separation, because it not 
only protects the world from religion, but it protects religion from the world (Casanova 1994: 
49).
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Indoctrinating the youth?
The distinguished Australian Muslim scholar Shahram Akbarzadeh has written that ‘contrary 
to the views of former treasurer Peter Costello, devout Muslims do not champion the 
establishment of sharia law in Australia. What is important for them is no different to other 
groups. Education opportunities and employment prospects for themselves and their kids rates 
much higher than any other concerns’ (2008).
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He has a point. Contrary to common perceptions, Australia’s Muslim communities 
overwhelmingly support the separation of secular education from Islamic religious teachings. 
Most Muslims are neither pushing to establish a distinct religious school system, nor are they 
attempting to introduce religious education into state schools. Rather, attempted reforms are 
restricted to ensuring that their children are educated with Islamic values in mind. These 
values are generally not specific to Islam, but rather apply across many different religions. 
This is evident in the striking numbers of Muslim parents who send their children to Christian 
schools - around 30-40% - due to the single-sex environment at secondary level, and the 
strong moral education foundation (Morris 2003b; Saeed 2003). There is overwhelming 
support for a new secularism which requires the separation of religious and secular 
institutions.
Those parents who do not send their children to Christian schools overwhelmingly prefer the 
state education system. Only around 10 percent of all Muslim children attend Islamic schools 
(Clyne 2001: 117). One dominant justification which surfaced in Irene Clyne’s 2001 study 15 
was the perceived sub-standard secular education provided by many Islamic schools. Clyne’s 
interviewees showed themselves to be supporters of the new secularism by overwhelmingly 
choosing not to send their children to Islamic schools because of the poor academic standards 
and limited resources, and thus choosing a good secular education over religious instruction 
(2001: 133). 
Clyne identifies two competing expectations that Muslim parents possess: the expectation that 
their child will gain the high standard of education that has become essential to achieve a 
secure future, and the expectation that education is shaped by their own cultural background 
and the strengths of their religious beliefs (2001: 119). This involves a trade-off between a 
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good education, which will ensure participation in broader Australian society, and religious 
identity, which will ensure full participation in the Muslim or ethnic communities. The 
prioritisation of the first expectation indicates that the requirement of a comprehensive secular 
education has trumped the desire for religious teachings. Instead, parents ensure that their 
children obtain a religious education through special after-school or weekend classes or 
religious teaching at home. They believe that ‘on balance, their children should receive a good 
secular education at school and a good religious education at home’ (Clyne 2001: 133). This 
attitude is reflected in the words of one Muslim teacher who criticised Islamic schools for 
allowing parents to opt out of their responsibilities:
‘By sending their children to Islamic schools, parents are washing their hands of 
their responsibility to teach Islam to their children’ (Clyne 2001: 133).
Adherents of this view generally feel that being accepted by peers in a conflict-free manner 
and learning to live within the new society is more important than comprehensive religious 
education. This involves the literal confinement of education to two different spheres: 
religious education to the home and mosque, and secular education to the school. 
Where controversies arise over the fusion of religion and secular education, they usually 
involve a push for education which is consonant with Islamic values, rather than a call for 
Islamic religious education.  Parents feel that state schools are not promoting the type of 
behaviour which is expected. For the Muslim parents involved in Clyne’s consultations, 
correct behaviour was defined in cultural terms such as ‘protecting family name’ or ‘shaming 
the family’ rather than Islamic terms. One respondent suggested that their idea of correct 
behaviour involved ‘respect for authority, a reserved and modest manner, consideration for 
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others, integrity and honesty in all dealings and negotiation before conflict’ (Clyne 2001: 
123). An example of this distinction is the debate over calls to outlaw religious symbols in 
schools. Battles surrounding the hijab as a public religious symbol are often fought in the 
classroom. Yet those who contest the presence of religious symbols in public schools in effect 
force many Muslims to send their children to private, Islamic schools, where the hijab is a 
uniform requirement (Haywood 2004). In this case, the creation of separate religious schools 
would be the result of an inability to gain a secular education whilst adhering to Islamic 
values.
These parents would prefer to place their children in the secular mainstream education 
system, if the curriculum is monitored for anti-Muslim sentiments and activities which 
undermine Islamic values (Clyne 2001: 117). However, Muslim parents often lack confidence 
to negotiate changes to the school curriculum (Clyne 2001: 132). Some possible ways to 
operationalise this approach include monitoring education programs and textbooks for anti-
Muslim sentiments, and finding alternatives for inappropriate activities such as mixed 
swimming classes or sex education. These actions require the Muslim community to be 
proactive in ensuring that teachers and educational authorities are informed about Muslim 
beliefs and values. In May 2010, substantial progress was made in developing this approach. 
The document Bringing Muslim Perspectives into Australian Schools purportedly assists 
teachers in state and private schools to integrate the study of Islam and Muslims into the 
curriculum, and to ensure that activities are sensitive to Islamic values. A similar attempt was 
made in 1998 to suggest strategies for meeting Muslim needs within the secular education 
system (Abdel-Halim 1998). Such strategies enhance the ability of Muslims to participate in 
the secular education system.
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POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Representing religions
Further support for the main argument of this dissertation is the fact that Muslims in Australia 
overwhelmingly both respect and support the secular nature of political institutions, and their 
independence from religious influence. This section looks to a recent report, Political 
Participation of Muslims in Australia, which supports this argument. It then moves to analyse 
the policies and campaigns of the first and only Muslim elected to the federal parliament (in 
2010): Ed Husic. Whilst the election of a Muslim to the federal parliament inevitably fulfills 
the desire of Muslim communities to have their religion physically represented and, thus, feel 
themselves to be part of the Australian political community, it is of interest that Husic 
emphasises that he does not represent Australian Muslims.
In June 2010, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship commissioned a study of the 
political participation of Muslims, which involved in-depth interviewing of thirty individuals 
who were politically active, or influential within and beyond Australian Muslim communities 
(Al-Momani et al. 2010: 9). It made an important finding: that all participants universally 
rejected any suggestion that they represented a specifically Muslim constituency. One 
interviewee declared that ‘we all live under one roof: the Australian political system’ (Al-
Momani et al. 2010: 61). All emphasised that they represented their geographical constituents, 
regardless of religion, and that they were careful to make all political decisions on their merits 
(Al-Momani et al. 2010: 4).
A political Muslim’s religiosity tends to foster an intentional secularity in terms of 
policymaking. One participant - Hicham Zraika, Labor Mayor of Auburn - felt that his 
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identification with his religious community put an additional onus on him to be consciously 
fair and equitable at all times and to demonstrate that he is not just speaking for Muslims, 
especially when issues such as the development of religious facilities come up for debate (Al-
Momani et al. 2010: 19).  Zraika emphasised that‘I represent the whole community, and I’m 
not in it to say I’m a Muslim candidate for the Muslim people. I’m an Australian candidate for 
the Auburn community’. We might say, to put things paradoxically, that the religiosity of the 
Lord Mayor is the condition of possibility of his emphatic secularity as a representative of 
Auburn.
Such secularist views are found not only among those running for election, and who wish to 
attract a wide constituency. The report cites one participant explaining their decision to vote 
for a particular individual:
‘Even if he’s a Muslim, that means nothing. There are many non-Muslim MPs 
who understand what is happening to Muslim communities and we can talk to 
them openly...Whether representatives are Muslim or Christian it doesn’t matter, 
we just want them to treat us as equals’ (Al-Momani et al. 2010: 61)
The report suggested that among younger Muslims especially, there may be a shift from the 
traditional Labor Party vote to the Greens (Al-Momani et al. 2010: 47). This reflects a desire 
to be publicly heard and acknowledged, more than anything. Many felt that Muslims’ 
traditional Labor voting had made the Party complacent and unresponsive to their concerns 
(Al-Momani et al. 2010: 47). This is reinforced by a recent article on the website Muslim 
Village. It asks Muslims to vote in whichever way would ensure that their electorate would 
become a ‘swing seat’, allowing them to gain a voice (Village 2010). This followed a call by 
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Samier Dandan, president of the Lebanese Muslim Association, to do the same. In a speech, 
he said: ‘We have reasonable and solid expectations of what our community deserves, not as 
Muslims, but simply as Australian citizens’ (2010). Dandan urged Muslims to focus on the 
issues - both religious and secular. As well religious burial16 and mosque construction17, he 
cited concerns over access to healthcare, and rising unemployment in Bankstown and 
Lidcombe. 
In 2004, the group which edits the MuslimVillage website, along with a coalition of Muslim 
organisations, put together the Australian Muslim Electoral Taskforce, which settled on a 
number of key issues and approached the major political parties. The issues included 
‘Palestine...pornography, censorship of media, settlement...freedom of religion, Islamic 
schools [and] anti-discrimination’. The Greens and Democrats responded, whilst Labor and 
Liberal ‘just didn’t really care’ (Al-Momani et al. 2010: 24). It was the willingness of the 
Greens to be responsive to the needs of Muslim communities, rather than any cultural or 
religious affinity with Greens principles, that was the most important factor in attracting the 
Muslim vote. The increase in support for the Greens has occurred despite the incompatibility 
with many of the party’s policies with Islamic principles. This is exemplified by the issue of 
same-sex marriage, which is prohibited in Islam. Many of the interviewees who were 
members of the Greens supported the party’s position on same-sex marriage, and all agreed 
that they could not support human rights for their own communities whilst denying those 
rights to the gay and lesbian community (Al-Momani et al. 2010: 45). The rising vote for the 
Greens despite these ostensible ‘moral’ disagreements perhaps indicates that in matters of 
party politics, Muslim communities are very much for the new secularism. 
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The election of the only federal Muslim parliamentarian, Ed Husic, the Member for Chifley, 
further demonstrates the commitment of Muslim representatives to the secular nature of 
political institutions. From a Bosnian family, Mr Husic describes himself as a non-practising, 
‘cultural’ Muslim. Yet he was the first Australian MP to be sworn in with the Qur’an, and he 
does report experiences of religiously-based prejudice in his political pursuits (Wilson 2010). 
Husic has accused elements within the Liberal party in Western Sydney of repeatedly seeking 
to use his Muslim background as a divisive political issue (Dikeos 2010). Whilst running in 
2004 for the neighbouring seat of Greenway, traditionally a Labor stronghold, the issue of his 
Muslim faith was targeted directly. Fake flyers describing him as a devout Muslim working 
hard to get a better deal for Islam in Greenway were distributed (pictured below). Though 
successful in Chifley in 2010, there was, as a result, an 11.6% swing away from Labor in that 
seat. 
  Figure 6: the fake flyer distributed by Husic’s opponents in the 2004 Greenway election
That Australia now has a Muslim representative in its federal parliament is significant for two 
reasons. First, it suggests a determination by the broader Australian community that a person’s 
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religion is not necessarily their defining feature. Secondly, it is a reaffirmation that Muslims 
are choosing a different path than that offered by extremists (Husic 2006: 96). Husic 
maintains that he does not see himself as a religious vessel in the political arena. In a 2006 
speech in which he dealt with the 2004 campaign against him, Husic stated, 
‘I always saw myself as just a regular Australian, who happened to be Muslim. I 
never saw myself as a Muslim candidate. I ran because I wanted to get things 
done for the area I grew up in’ (Husic 2006: 92).
Husic’s attitude emphasises that Australian Muslims are eager to participate in Australian 
political institutions in their capacity as Australian citizens, rather than as representatives of 
their religion. There is not only a toleration of the secular nature of these institutions, but 
vigorous support for it. A Muslim identity forces a candidate to be consciously even-handed 
equitable towards their constituents, regardless of religion. Rather than threatening the 
secularism of Australian political institutions, it seems that the participation of Muslims 
enhances it. 
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CONCLUSION
The evidence assembled above demands a rethinking of secularism in Australia. This 
dissertation called into question entrenched presumptions, demonstrating that accusations that 
Islam inherently conflates religious and political power are misplaced; and that traditional 
theories of secularisation can no longer adequately explain the complex dynamics of the 
contemporary world. Conversations and beliefs based upon these presumptions must be 
challenged, and a culture of tolerance fostered through acceptance of the place of public 
religions in Australian society. This dissertation has shown that commentators, intellectuals 
and politicians who adopt the language of secularism often have little understanding of its 
history. Ignorant of the past, they inevitably misunderstand the present. Policies of secularism 
based upon these presumptions and misunderstandings mistakenly view religious decline as a 
civilising process, with Islam as an impediment to that process. 
This dissertation uncovered evidence, hitherto shockingly ignored, to argue that contrary to 
common perceptions Australian Muslims overwhelmingly support the independence of the 
secular state from religious institutions and norms. Whilst Islam will continue to flourish in 
the Australian public sphere, the apprehension which accompanies this public religiosity is 
misplaced. Chapter three revealed that there is no mainstream desire in the fields of law and 
education to establish parallel religious institutions , or to institutionalise a distinctly Muslim 
religious perspective into Australian politics. Instead, there exists great tolerance for the 
autonomy of secular institutions, and recognition of the need to work within the existing 
institutions to find ways to accommodate the diverse needs of Muslim communities. 
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The themes of this dissertation are not unique to Australia, yet if Australia embraces religious 
secularity, it may help to inspire profound reforms on a global level. Australia might emerge 
as a pioneer of good practice. Its new, more tolerant and democratic secularism could serve as 
an important model for Western Europe, which is currently fortifying its public spaces against 
religious intrusion, exacerbating social exclusion. Conflicts between Muslims and the old 
secularism in Europe are commonplace - from the Rushdie affair in 1998, to the hijab 
disputes in France and elsewhere, to the cartoons crisis of 2005. Despite all this, and 
mirroring the situation in Australia described in chapters two and three, Muslims in Europe 
acknowledge and praise the secular character of European states (Cesari 2009a: 287). That 
being so, the battles that have arisen are principally to do with the ostensibly secular nature of 
European societies: the status of Islam in public life, the delimitation of the public and private 
sphere, religious freedom, freedom of expression, and the visibility of religious practices.  
In the face of such disputes, in Europe as in Australia, a redefinition of secularism may 
resolve some of the difficulties produced by Muslim integration. The new secularism has 
great political potential. Further study is crucial. Methods of enhancing the inclusion of 
Muslims within secular institutions must be further developed. Studies could specifically 
engage with the views of Muslim individuals and communities through in-depth interviews 
about the old and new secularisms. An examination of the relationship between the new 
secularism and policies of multiculturalism would be invaluable. From such studies, it is 
conceivable that policy changes could take place in line with this new way of thinking. Room 
could be made within secular institutions for Islamic values and practices. Representative 
bodies of different Muslim communities might be supported in the political arena, to ensure 
that Muslim voices are heard. Importantly, political parties should be forced to clarify their 
positions as to what secularism in Australia entails, to minimise uninformed speculation in the 
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media based upon archaic European ideologies of secularism. The implication: religious 
secularity is a real possibility in Australia.
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